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Note
ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM
JACOB WERRETT
Recent economic fallout has revealed that the United States mortgage
industry needs reform. Unlike other similar industries, the mortgage
lending industry lacked fundamental safeguards such as centralized
regulation, adequate capital reserves, sufficient insurance backstops, and
strict federal oversight. As a result, loose lending spawned reckless buying
which, in turn, led to financial disaster. In the wake of catastrophe, the
federal government intervened; regardless of whether federal intervention
was necessary to prevent systemic calamity, the solution was insufficient to
create long-term stability and exposed the economy to moral hazard. This
Note explains what happened in the mortgage industry, how it affected the
national economy, and what solution can be deployed to help avoid
systemic risk in the future.
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ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM
JACOB WERRETT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has plummeted headlong into a financial bugaboo.
For nearly a year, the media has labored to fix blame on top executives,
bogus investment vehicles, inflated stock markets, and irresponsible
investing. Contrary to the popular media, the core problem may not be the
result of the typical age-old scapegoats. In 2008, financial trouble may
have spawned primarily from one core problem—a broken mortgage
lending legal system. This Note asserts that the United States’ financial
crisis is a result of our having relied on an out-of-date mortgage lending
system created nearly a century ago—an entirely ancient system in light of
today’s intricate primary market mortgage products and risk-exposed
secondary mortgage market products.1
The mortgage lending industry lacks fundamental industry safeguards,
such as centralized regulation, adequate capital reserves, an insurance
backstop, and strict federal oversight. As a result, the last decade has
brought irresponsible lending, uninformed buying, careless underwriting,
negligent securitization of mortgage loans (collateralized debt obligations),
and reckless insurance of those securitizations (credit default swaps).2
With all of the financial trouble, even some staunch supporters of
deregulation have diverged from strict federalist doctrines to concede that
something should be done.3
As a result, this Note suggests several possible solutions to the
*
University of Utah, B.A.; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., candidate 2010. Jacob
Werrett is a partner and former principal broker of Thornton Walker, Inc., a real estate brokerage in
Salt Lake City, Utah.
1
ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 507 (2008) (“Large losses suffered on securitized
American subprime mortgages triggered the crisis, of course . . . .”); Henry Paulson, Fighting the
Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A1 (“I have always said that
the decline in the housing market is at the root of the economic downturn and our financial market
stress. And the economy, as it slows further, threatens to prolong this decline, as well as the stress on
our financial institutions and financial markets.”).
2
The media’s coverage of credit default swaps has focused primarily on the negligent use of
swaps by banks as capital, the improper rating of swaps by rating agencies, and the careless issuance of
swaps by insurance entities without retaining adequate reserves. Matthew Philips, The Monster that
Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46. While this Note neglects a full discussion of the
mainstream credit default swap issues, it is still important to note that a more stable mortgage and real
estate market would have prevented a full-blown meltdown of both the nation’s collateralized debt
obligations and credit default swaps—regardless of whether the products were sound or not. Id.;
Paulson, supra note 1.
3
Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at
B1.
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financial meltdown. Part II explains why the most effective way to address
the nation’s financial problem is to pursue reform in the mortgage lending
industry. That section also describes how irresponsible mortgage lending
and borrowing led the economy into the recent financial crisis and asserts
that inadequate capital reserves, insufficient regulation, unsatisfactory
secondary mortgage market accountability, and unacceptable mortgagebacked securitization all contributed to create the perfect financial storm.
Part III provides a framework for discussing viable solutions to the
problem. An effective long-term financial solution must have at least three
fundamental characteristics to be successful. First, the solution should be
focused on mortgage reform. Second, the solution must be deployed on a
federal level in order to achieve consistency and immediacy. And third,
capital reserves—whether accumulated by institutions, industries,
government, or insurance—are an essential element of the solution.
Part IV describes a possible solution to the country’s financial
problems—a solution that would not create moral hazard or systemic risk,
as the government’s recent solutions have. The proposal focuses on
forming a governmental entity—the Federal Mortgage Insurance
Corporation (“FMIC”)—to concurrently regulate the mortgage industry
and provide financial reserves. This section outlines how the FMIC would
function, and compares similarly structured entities and industries: the
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”), and the private mortgage insurance industry
(“PMI”).
II. THE PROBLEM
Beginning with a subprime mortgage lending disaster, which was
exacerbated by the fall of an irrationally exuberant housing market, the
United States economy has sunken into one of the worst economic
recessions in nearly a century.4 The problem grew as a result of a series of
major missteps that have paralyzed effective solutions moving forward.
First, the mortgage market began the domino effect. In retrospect, it is
clear that the subprime mortgage market posed systemic risk because of
loose regulation, lack of capital reserves, and lack of proper insurance.5
Second, to address the problem, the government was forced to act hastily
in three distinct phases: to avoid recession, to avoid contagion, and to
avoid depression. While each of these phases may have been necessary,
the solutions deployed in each effort fell short of providing proper long4
Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18,
2008, at A1.
5
See infra Part II.A. The above named mortgage problems spawned further disaster by
exacerbating irresponsible mortgage-backed securitization of risky loans and negligent insuring of
those securitizations by way of credit default swaps.

2009]

ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM

323

term solutions. In fact, each phase of government intervention may have
actually contributed to future systemic calamity.6 Third, disagreement as
to how the government should have acted to curb systemic risk flowing
from the mortgage market handicapped Congress. In light of convincing
theories going in entirely different directions—usually based on militant
partisanship—Congress has done little to stabilize the mortgage market
through requirements of responsible lending, responsible reporting,
responsible insurance, and proper hedging against industry risk.7
A. How the Mortgage Market Caused Systemic Calamity in 2008
It is difficult to say exactly when and how the United States’ current
financial problem began. Rather than a specific instance, the financial
crisis came as a result of multiple events and factors. While much of the
collateral damage in 2008 and early 2009 surfaced outside the spectrum of
mortgage lending, there is little doubt that mortgages were among the most
fundamental causes.
The first problem in the mortgage industry was insufficient regulation
of risky loan products. During the 1980s, rates were high—as much as
fifteen percent—and few could afford to buy a home.8 In an effort to make
loans more affordable, lenders began pushing adjustable rate mortgages
(“ARMs”).9 These loans allowed buyers to contract for the home they
wanted, find alternative funding, and get out before the “bad loan” began
to ratchet up and cost more per month than the borrower could afford. In
the 1990s, rates came down, and lenders continued to offer alternative
lending packages, including no money down loans, subprime ARMs, and
interest only loans.10 During the next decade, these creative financing
options became more and more popular and increasingly accessible.
Consumer interest in “creative financing” was fueled significantly by the
real estate boom that occurred between 2001 and 2008. By 2006, the
National Association of Realtors (“NAR”) reported that an astonishing
forty-three percent of all first time home loans originated that year were
interest only loans.11
Aggravating the problem, the twenty-first century ushered in a
6

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See ERATE Historical Mortgage Rates, http://www.erate.com/mortgage_rates_history.htm.
9
See Diana G. Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan
Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 MO. L. REV. 179, 180 (1982); see also Ryan
Barnes, The Fuel that Fed the Subprime Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/07/subprime-overview.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
10
See Liz Moyer, Beware Interest-Only, FORBES, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/services/
2005/12/06/interest-only-mortgages-cx_lm_1207mortgage.html.
11
Noelle Knox, 43% of First Time Home Buyers Put No Money Down, USA TODAY, Jan. 18,
2006, at 1A.
7
8
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multitude of creative ways to get into a home with no money down. This
allowed borrowers to purchase homes with virtually no personal risk of
loss. Some critics blamed politicians and political agendas for muddying
the water by supporting risky lending—either by deregulation, at one end
of the spectrum, or by pushing financial equality at the other. In any case,
many companies, and even the federal government, made efforts to lower
lending standards and aggressively worked to “help[] families realize the
American Dream of homeownership.”12 The FHA even extended loans to
first-time homebuyers with no money down through seller-funded
downpayment programs.13 Other lenders allowed buyers to obtain an 80%
loan from one lender and a 20% loan from another, thus allowing 100%
financing.14 Still other lenders provided one hundred percent financing
with a requirement to purchase private mortgage insurance to cover twenty
percent of the loan.15 Under these “no equity” scenarios, half of the
nation’s buyers were a short-downturn-in-the-market away from owing
more on their homes than the home was worth. And that is just what
happened. The result, by mid 2008, was that a greater percentage of
people were upside down in their mortgages than during any time in
history since the Great Depression.16 And, with so many homeowners with
little-to-no money invested into their homes (as a result of no money down
mortgage lending) and zero to negative equity positions, foreclosures
jumped dramatically.
Second, the mortgage securities market exacerbated the problem by
encouraging subprime lending and even discouraging prime lending. In
the 1930s the government created Fannie Mae to help fund the primary
mortgage market.17 Eventually this entity became a government-sponsored
entity (“GSE”). Fannie provided a market for the sale of mortgagor
obligations, which provided more capital to the primary market. The
positive result was that more money flowing into the secondary market
provided more money in the primary market—resulting in more home
loans. This revolution in mortgages, created by the inception of a bona
fide secondary market, provided a way to finance more mortgages and
therefore begin the steep climb out of the financial dregs of the Great
12

Alphonso Jackson, Remarks at Access Across America Economic Empowerment Summit (Oct.
14, 2004), available at www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2004-10-14.cfm.
13
See Federal Housing Administration, Neighborhood Gold Down Payment Assistance,
http://www.fha-home-loans.com/neighborhood_gold_down_payment_assistance_program.htm
(providing that the Gold Account is a type of escrow account/vehicle allowing the seller to contribute
to the buyer’s downpayment in a real estate closing).
14
Dave Ramsey, Is an 80/20 Mortgage a Good Idea?, WORLDNETDAILY, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=29928.
15
Id.
16
Edmund L. Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues for Homeowners in Debt Weighed, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at A1.
17
About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
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Depression. When the secondary market needed more capital to buy loans
from the primary market it would bundle the loans and sell mortgagorpayment-rights to investors. This securitization process by Fannie and
other GSEs is known as mortgage-backed securitization.18 The key to
understanding why securitization corrupted the entire mortgage system is
recognizing that the flow of money into the mortgage industry is based
upon securitization. These pools of securitized loans include both prime
and subprime loans. To increase investor interest in subprime loans, many
Wall Street companies preferred that primary lenders gather less borrower
documentation, making the borrower’s profile more opaque and thus more
attractive.19 This provided primary market lenders with incentive to sell
loans without mortgagor documentation—called “no doc loans”
(applications lacking tax returns, income statements, bank statements,
etc).20 Thus, loose mortgage securitization standards spawned loose
mortgage lending practices, which opened the door for fraud and
irresponsible lending and borrowing.21
Third, a housing bubble developed as a result of low interest rates and
low threshold loans. These two factors had been important barriers that
kept real estate purchases down. With both barriers to entry eliminated,
homebuyers rushed to take advantage of low interest rates set by the
Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) and for the first time ever subprime buyers
were able to join the buying frenzy with little or no money down. The
bubble became a problem when irrational exuberance deflated and prices
subsequently declined.22
Normally when a person loses their job, or their adjustable rate
mortgage adjusts and makes the loan too expensive, the owner can just sell
18
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
Mortgage backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to
the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential
property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other
originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental,
or private entity. The entity then issues securities that represent claims on the
principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a
process known as securitization. Most MBSs are issued by the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), a U.S. government agency, or the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), U.S. government sponsored Enterprises.
Id.
19
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2048–49 (2007).
20
Id.
21
See id. at 2049 (discussing the securitization of mortgage loans and the connection with
subprime lending); ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS HAPPENED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–10 (2008) (“The stage was perfectly set for
unscrupulous mortgage originators to lend to low income people who were likely to default, and for
mortgage securitizers to sell the soon-to-default mortgages off to unsuspecting investors.”).
22
See SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 21, at 1–10.
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their home. But, after the housing market boomed and then subsequently
deflated, many owners owed the bank more for their home than the market
was willing to pay. As a result, a person whose life circumstances required
them to sell their home was forced to either pay the difference (often an
impossible proposition for an already financially distressed seller) or stop
making full payments and take steps toward inevitable foreclosure. A
report in late 2008 found that among persons who purchased homes
between 2003 and 2008, 29% owed more on their home than the home was
worth.23 Approximately twelve million homeowners faced a serious risk of
foreclosure by late 2008, representing nearly sixteen percent of all
homeowners in the country.24 And, in 2008, foreclosure filings were up
approximately 81% from 2007 and 225% from 2006.25
Fourth, the mortgage problem became a disaster because lending
institutions were undercapitalized, insufficiently insured, and held and
offered portfolios that were not properly diversified. There were several
ways in which the lending institutions failed to hedge against risk: (1) they
did not invest in collateral that tends to rise in value when other collateral
tends to decrease (hedge); (2) they failed to purchase sufficient insurance
against expansive assets for which they were exposed; (3) they failed to
develop the necessary reserves to facilitate liquidity in times of crisis; and
(4) they failed to underwrite conservatively. Importantly, the cost of
foreclosure became even greater during the economic downturn, because
the value of the collateral declined. In a stable economy, banks can expect
to lose an average of 29% of the loan amount in the process of foreclosing
on a house to recoup the collateral funds.26 In 2008 and much of 2009,
banks were losing approximately 44% of the loan amount, as a result of
significant market decline.27 Unfortunately, as of late 2008 only about
10% of the country’s mortgage debt was insured,28 and among insured
lenders, most are only insured up to 20%.29 This means that the average
lending institution is exposed to significant risk, and more importantly, in
23
James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Pain Gauge: Nearly 1 in 6 Owners “Under Water,”
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A5.
24
See id. (noting that twelve million homeowners were underwater).
25
Stephanie Armour, 2008 Foreclosure Fillings Set Record, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2009, at 1B;
see also Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Up: 1 in 84 Homes Affected in First Half of Year, USA
TODAY, July 16, 2009, at 3B (reporting nearly two million foreclosures during the first six months of
2009).
26
Damian Paletta et al., U.S. Steps Up Help for Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at A3.
27
Id.
28
See discussion infra Part IV.A. (discussing data illustrating that mortgage insurance is primarily
provided by three entities: the Federal Housing Administration, the Veterans Administration, and the
private mortgage industry: Together these three providers of insurance insure approximately $1.5
trillion in debt. Comparatively, the nation’s consumers currently have over $13 trillion in outstanding
mortgage debt.).
29
MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF AMERICA, 2008–2009 FACT BOOK & MEMBER
DIRECTORY 6 (2008–09) [hereinafter MICA FACTBOOK] (discussing that private mortgage insurance
companies generally cover twenty percent).
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an era where companies are “too big to fail,” this problem puts the entire
economic system at risk.
Thus, in the wake of mortgage catastrophe, the government was forced
to seize and bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—mammoth secondary
market mortgage holders—by dedicating two hundred billion dollars of
taxpayers’ money.30 Only a few weeks later, Congress voted to allow the
Treasury to bail out banks and other financial intermediaries linked
indirectly to the mortgage market by passing a bill to inject seven hundred
billion dollars into the economy.31 The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Paulson, stated that he, too, believed the mortgage lending institutions and
the products they sold were at the root of the financial crisis: “The
underlying weakness in our financial system today is the illiquid mortgage
assets that have lost value as the housing correction has proceeded. . . . As
we all know, lax lending practices earlier this decade led to irresponsible
lending and irresponsible borrowing.”32
B. Why Recent Government Action Has Not Provided a Viable Solution
Another significant part of the 2008 financial problem was that the
government reacted, as opposed to acted, and was forced to do so hastily,
as opposed to thoughtfully. The government’s overall “plan” emerged in
three distinct phases: (1) to stop recession; (2) to stop contagion; and (3) to
avoid depression. Each of these steps was defensive—as opposed to
offensive—and was prompted by plans to stop the financial crisis from
spreading. While these phases have been somewhat effective, government
intervention has failed to address the crux of the financial problem—the
need for meaningful reform in the mortgage industry. The government’s
actions within each of these phases of government intervention has
provided a short term solution for a long-term problem. More specifically,
30
Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Fannie, Freddie Bailout Greeted with Cautious Optimism, REUTERS,
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0527106320080909.
31
Alan S. Blinder, Got $700 Billion? Sweat the Details, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at BU1.
32
Henry Paulson, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Press Room, Sept. 19, 2008,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm. Paulson continued:
What began as a subprime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky
mortgages, and contributed to excess home inventories that have pushed down home
prices for responsible homeowners.
A similar scenario is playing out among the lenders who made those mortgages,
the securitizers who bought, repackaged and resold them, and the investors who
bought them. These troubled loans are now parked, or frozen, on the balance sheets
of banks and other financial institutions, preventing them from financing productive
loans. The inability to determine their worth has fostered uncertainty about
mortgage assets, and even about the financial condition of the institutions that own
them. The normal buying and selling of nearly all types of mortgage assets has
become challenged.
These illiquid assets are clogging up our financial system, and undermining the
strength of our otherwise sound financial institutions.
Id.
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each government initiative has failed to provide protection against future
systemic financial failure, and in some instances, government action has
actually increased market exposure to systemic calamity.
1. Avoid Recession
First, in order to slow recession, the Fed cut interest rates for several
consecutive months until it finally reached one percent on October 29,
2008.33 That ultra-low rate represented the lowest rate––and as such was
arguably the most drastic Fed action––since Dwight Eisenhower was
president.34 Ever since the stock market crash of 1929, the Fed has been
under significant pressure to lift rates when the country’s finances
tighten.35 The theory is that after an economic bubble bursts, or after a
major catastrophe (like the recent precipitous decline of housing prices and
simultaneous spike in foreclosures), the market slows because investors are
hesitant to inject capital into a risky economy—effectively declining to
throw good money after bad and banks horde money in order to shore up
capital reserves. The result causes a negative feedback loop that ultimately
leads to recession. Investor caution results in less capital in the secondary
mortgage market, which leads to less capital in the primary mortgage
market. This chain reaction creates an increasingly difficult financial
environment for homebuyers to qualify for loans. If qualifying for a home
loan becomes increasingly difficult, then there is less demand for homes in
the market; this results in less building of homes and prices are then
lowered to compete against the increase of homes for sale (high supply,
low demand). This process causes builders and construction workers to
lose jobs, which results in an economy with even fewer buyers. Thus, the
whole system is cyclical. So, when the Fed lowers interest rates it allows
banks to more easily borrow funds from the Fed’s discount window or
through the Federal Reserve Fund, and the process injects capital into the
slowing economy to stop the negative feedback loop.
But, when the Fed is forced to lower interest rates considerably, it
33
Mark Thomas, Fed Cuts Target Rate to One Percent, ECON. VIEW, Oct. 29, 2008,
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/10/fed-cuts-target.html (“The pace of
economic activity appears to have slowed markedly, owing importantly to a decline in consumer
expenditures. Business equipment spending and industrial production have weakened in recent
months, and slowing economic activity in many foreign economies is damping the prospects for U.S.
exports. Moreover, the intensification of financial market turmoil is likely to exert additional restraint
on spending, partly by further reducing the ability of households and businesses to obtain credit.”).
34
Rupert Cornwall, Half Point Cut Takes U.S. Into Interest Rates Lowest Level Since Eisenhower,
INDEP. BUS., Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/halfpoint-cut-takes-usinterest-rates-to-lowest-level-since-eisenhower-era-616173.html.
35
MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 79–83 (1980) (“The stock market crash was important,
but it was not the beginning of the depression . . . . These depressing effects of the stock market crash
were strongly reinforced by the subsequent behavior of the Federal Reserve System . . . . [T]he fed’s
actions were hesitant and small. In the main, it stood idly by and let the crisis take its course—a pattern
of behavior that was to be repeated again and again during the next two years.”).
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exposes the economic system to risk, because it is one of the most effective
means for fighting recession—and once it is used, it is used. This concept
led Alan Greenspan to refer to raising interest rates in anticipation of
economic trouble as building “a bit of insurance”36—that is, by raising
interest rates, the Fed is able to prepare the effectiveness of its weapon for
use in times of economic trouble. Supporting this theory, others have
warned, “the Fed probably would want to stop short of zero, so it saves its
precious ammunition.”37 With the rates already at record lows during 2008
and 2009, the Fed’s strongest tool for jumpstarting the economy was
exhausted. In sum, the Fed correctly lowered interest rates to avoid
recession, but the U.S. economic system would be less volatile and would
be exposed to less risk if this action was not the first measure taken (or the
first measure available)—since it may also be the last hope.
In the past, we have seen that different industries are so massive that
turbulence within one industry can derail the entire market. The bank
panic of 1907 seized the entire economy; the stock market crash of 1929
set off the Great Depression; the mortgage and housing fallout of 2007 has
similarly slowed the entire financial system—banks, stocks, lenders,
builders, and the auto industry have all begun to fail as a result.38 For this
reason, systemic risk is best restrained by establishing capital reserves,
insurance, and financial safeguards within each individual market within
an economy. By stabilizing individual companies, industries, and markets
we can ensure that entire economies do not totally collapse and set off
nationwide financial failure. Serially cutting interest rates—effectively
giving out free government loans—only precipitates irresponsible lending
and leaves the economy exposed to greater risk.
2. Avoid Contagion
The second phase of government action was to avoid contagion. As
the financial crisis continued, the government was forced to take additional
action to contain the deterioration of the financial markets, due to a few
bad assets and failing companies. Many companies in dire straits were
considered by the government to be “too big to fail”—that is, companies
that were so big that bankruptcy would cause a domino effect and slow or
stop the entire economy. This concept of too big to fail did not originate
36

GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 201–02.
Jeannine Aversa, How Low Can the Fed Go On Interest Rates?, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20081029/analysis-how-low-can-fed-go-on-interest-rates.htm.
38
GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 513 (“Why for the first time in eight decades, did banks and the
securities markets get hit hard simultaneously? The answer appears to be that both now draw
increasingly on the same sources of funds. For much of the twentieth century, savers’ deposits, largely
insured by the federal government, were the main source of funding for banks, while securities firms
relied on investors for their short-term funds. Savers are legendarily “passive”—for instance, in the
late 1970s, even as interest rates on safe, short-term investments climbed into double digits, many bank
customers doggedly kept their money in fixed rate 5.5 percent passbook accounts.”).
37
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with the 2008 financial crisis; rather, it was introduced during the Dot Com
Era. In 1998, one of Wall Street’s largest and most successful hedge
funds—Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”)—was saved by the
Fed because it was seen by many as too big to fail:
[The New York Fed] literally gathered top officials of sixteen
of the world’s most powerful banks and investment houses in
a room; suggested strongly that if they fully comprehended
the losses they would face in a forced fire sale of LTCM’s
assets they would work it out; and left. After days of
increasingly tense negotiations, the bankers came up with an
infusion of $3.5 billion for LTCM.39
This injection of money under the direction of the Fed gave LTCM enough
capital to sell off its assets in an orderly way and close its doors without
causing systemic calamity. The New York Times announced the Fed’s
intervention on the front page: “Seeing a Fund as Too Big to Fail, New
York Fed Assists Its Bailout.”40
Early in 2008, Bear Stearns began to show signs of financial
instability. After fully considering the size of Bear Stearns and its
influence on the market, the Treasury Secretary began attempts to broker a
shotgun marriage with another large intermediary.41 With some work, JP
Morgan Chase offered to purchase the failing institution, but only after the
government contributed an extra twenty-nine billion dollars to make the
merger work.42
In the wake of the Bear Stearns bailout, the government elected to
provide taxpayer support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.43 The
39

Id. at 195.
Gretchen Morgenson, The Markets; Seeing a Fund as Too Big To Fail, New York Fed Assists
Its Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at A1. Indeed, the Times article described the Fed’s action:
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has helped organize the rescue of a large
and prominent speculative fund, indicating that regulators recognize that the failure
of such a fund would damage already fragile world markets. Under an agreement
reached late yesterday, the fund, Long-Term Capital Management L.P. of
Greenwich, Conn., received a cash infusion of more than $3.5 billion from a
consortium of commercial banks and investment firms. The fund, whose founder is
John Meriwether, a former vice chairman of Salomon Inc., and whose partners
included two Nobel prize winners, is said to be have a portfolio worth $90 billion.
The deal came after representatives of 16 banks and brokerage houses met at the
offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in downtown Manhattan. It is
extremely unusual for the Federal Reserve to get involved in the bailout of such a
fund, known as a hedge fund, a virtually unregulated type of investment firm, which
despite its name, speculates in high-risk trades in markets around the world.
Id.
41
Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Week, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29,
2008, at A1.
42
Landon Thomas, Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JP Morgan Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at C1.
43
Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie: Regulators Seek to Keep
Firms’ Troubles From Setting Off Wave of Bank Failures, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at A01.
40
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government seized and supported the two entities—with the use of
taxpayer dollars—when their books began to show a catastrophic financial
future.44 The government effectively placed Freddie and Fannie into
“conservatorship”—a euphemism for declaring bankruptcy—and provided
a government bailout.45
During just one year, the government has committed hundreds of
billions of dollars to bailing out dozens of companies: (1) $45 billion to the
Bank of America; (2) $50 billion to Citigroup; (3) $70 billion to AIG; (4)
$85 billion to the auto industry—General Motors and Chrysler; (5) $7
billion to GMAC bank; (6) $25 billion to JP Morgan Chase; and (7) $25
billion to Wells Fargo.46
The problem with the steps the government has taken to stop contagion
is that it has effectively made institutions that are “too big to fail,” bigger.
In the case of Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and American Express, the
government has allowed these entities access to the Fed’s discount window
without requiring compliance to the stricter bank holding company
standards, for two years—maybe more.47 Without the government’s
money giveaway and money-sweetened merger techniques, these entities
would likely have been split up and sold, resulting in fewer “too big to
fail” companies. Ultimately, propping up mammoth institutions on the
brink of tumbling into smaller institutions may only put off and increase
the damage of an inevitable financial cataclysm.
3. Avoid Depression
During the latest phase, the government acted to avoid depression.48
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, presented a
seven hundred billion dollar bailout plan for American corporations.49
With an increasing number of too big to fail companies failing, the
Treasury and Fed created a plan that would allow federal funds to be
allocated largely at Paulson’s discretion and primarily as funds for bailouts

44

Id.
Id.
46
Matt Erickson et al., Tracking the 700 Billion Dollar Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009,
http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table.
47
Kristin Jones, Why is Everyone Becoming a Bank Holding Company?, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 12,
2008,
http://www.propublica.org/article/why-is-everyone-becoming-a-bank-holding-company-1112
(“The Fed has said that the companies have two years to comply with the stricter regulations on bank
holding companies, and it will allow extensions of a year at a time.”).
48
In some respects these “phases” overlapped and could be seen as one grand effort to avoid
depression. Although, as the economy worsened and contagion inevitably spread (or threatened to
spread) Congress became increasingly willing to act aggressively to avoid widespread economic
depression—as displayed in the final months of 2008.
49
Henry Paulson, Text of Draft Proposal for Bail Out Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html.
45
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50

and to purchase troubled assets. Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman
Bernanke both testified in front of Congress to garner support for the
bailout strategy. They proposed several arguments to garner support for
the plan, including that: it would stabilize the economy, it would improve
liquidity, it would provide a comprehensive strategy, it would bring
immediate action, it would have a broad impact, and it would stimulate
investor confidence.51
Another course of action taken by the government to avoid depression
was to inject capital into the market through the country’s largest banks.52
On October 13, the chief executives of the country’s nine largest banks
filed into a conference room where Secretary Paulson told them all that the
government was forcing them to accept government share purchases.53
The nine banks included Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo,
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of New
York Mellon, and State Street.54
The problem with the government’s final course of action was that for
decades owners of private corporations have enjoyed significant profits
and the public has not shared in those profits. Now, in an effort to avoid
depression, the Fed and Treasury were acting as insurers and socializing
the losses of the country’s largest institutions. If the government is
proving that these institutions need insurance, then it makes sense that they
should be properly insured—and more importantly that the premiums
should be paid by the institutions, not taxpayers. Privatizing profits and
socializing losses creates moral hazard.55
To date, the government has failed to attach proper requirements (like
requiring future insurance or significantly increased capital requirements)
upon those institutions that are receiving handouts. This “government
insurance” in the form of a “bailout plan” without a requirement that the
institutions commit to an industry insurance in the future, exposes the
nation to rampant moral hazard and ultimately to increased systemic risk.

50
Daniel Gross, How the Bail Out is Like a Hedge Fund, SLATE, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.slate.
com/id/2201340/.
51
Ben Bernanke, Address Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm.
52
Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1.
53
Id.
54
Id.; Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 2008, at A1.
55
Daniel Henninger, Welcome to ‘Moral Hazard’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A17 (“‘Moral
hazard’ dates back hundreds of years in obscurity, but its use eventually settled inside the insurance
business in the 19th century. The French call it risque moral. Back then, it really was taken to mean
that reducing risk too much exposed people to the hazard of poor moral judgments. If an insurer
charged too little for a policy to replace farms in the English countryside, Farmer Brown might be less
careful about cows knocking over oil lamps in the barn.”).
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C. Finding the Middle Ground for Dealing with Systemic Risk
Another hurdle to hedging against systemic risk by reforming
mortgage law is dealing with the polarized opinion about how to deal with
systemic risk. It is true that fundamentally dissimilar perspectives will
usually balance our federal economic agenda, but diametrically opposed
ideals can significantly retard the progress of efficient and helpful industry
reform.
1. One View: It Is Not Congress’s Job to Govern Mortgage Reform
Generally speaking, conservative thinkers want the government to
shrink and impose less regulation. This perspective is rooted in the idea
that the free market will provide its own oversight and that investors will
look out for themselves and protect their assets as long as government does
not take away critical hedging tools. From this federalist perspective, it is
not the central government’s job to quell systemic risk. Rather, it is the
federal government’s job to protect the citizen’s right to invest, buy, and
sell. Promoters of this school of thought agree that the very act of financial
self-protection, by everyone in a free market, provides the optimum
safeguard against systemic calamity.56
Defenders of conservative free market thinking assert that the recent
mortgage meltdown was exacerbated by market-meddling-liberals who
required low income financing and rallied around concepts of “housing for
everyone”—even those who could not afford a home.57 One of the most
prominent and ardent supporters of the free market correction theory is—
or, rather, was—Alan Greenspan, who preached deregulation for decades
while he labored as Federal Reserve Chairman. While he acknowledged
that markets could become inflated and instable, he also believed that
investors interested in preserving their own cash would protect
themselves—and thus protect the economy. Contributing to free market
thinking, many economists believe that “markets have become too
complex for effective human intervention,” and “the most promising anticrisis policies are those that maintain maximum market flexibility.”58
Thus, in light of possible mortgage reform, conservative thinking
warns that Congress’s meddling with regulation and market constraints
would potentially superficially kink and clog market efficiencies, which in
56

GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 489, 523.
The Mortgage Lender, Implode-O-Meter, http://ml-implode.com/sfdpacampaign.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009) (rallying opposition to a recent congressional efforts to lower thresholds for
consumers in the housing market).
58
GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 489, 523 (“[Governments and Central banks are] unable to
effectively thwart the waves of speculation, the best strategy is to ensure that our markets at all times
have enough flexibility and resilience, unencumbered by protectionism or rigid regulation, to absorb
and mitigate the shock of crisis.”).
57
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turn would expose the economy to greater systemic risk. Additionally, in
an increasingly complex and fast-paced marketplace, free marketers may
assert that that government intervention—in an industry like mortgage
lending—would only slow production and provide no real ability to
anticipate or quell systemic risk.60
2. Another View: It Is Congress’s Job to Head Mortgage Reform
On the other hand, liberal thinkers assert that the financial crisis of
2008 is a verdict against the failed policies of the Bush administration and
the conservative ideals of deregulation.61 Supporters of this school of
thought are persuaded that the federal government should intervene and be
an active regulator of markets in order to safeguard against systemic risk.
Additionally, liberal thinkers believe that necessary regulations extend to
health care, job security, and ultimately wealth distribution—balances that
keep the free market from imploding. Under this line of thinking,
mortgage regulation should be centralized and be conducted by the federal
government.
Prominent Yale scholar Robert Shiller asserted that market exuberance
should be dealt with by (1) influence, (2) statute, and (3) ongoing
regulation. Shiller asserted that economic bubbles are the result of
investment ignorance, fueling media influences, and conflicts of interest.62
In his book Irrational Exuberance, he suggested that economic experts,
government authorities, and trusted leaders of our country, have the
responsibility of blowing the whistle on inflated prices and dangerous
59
Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future
Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV. L. REV. 217, 255 (2009) (“In general, it is the free markets,
unencumbered by regulations, that are more creative and experience the fastest growth. . . . A heavily
regulated market might have lower volatility, but it is also more cumbersome and slow in developing
new and creative financial products that stimulate growth. The solution to our financial problems is not
to invest our resources in a new and restrictive system of regulations that is not flexible enough to keep
pace with a complex, innovative and increasingly global financial world.”); GREENSPAN, supra note 1,
at 174–75 (“A stock market boom, of course, is an economic plus—it predisposes businesses to
expand, makes consumers feel flush, and helps the economy to grow. . . . Only when a collapsing
market might threaten to hamstring the real economy is there cause for people like the Treasury
Secretary and the Chairman of the Fed to worry. . . . [This] sort of disaster happen[ed] in Japan, where
the economy was crippled from a stock and real estate collapse in 1990.”).
60
GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 490 (“In today’s world, I fail to see how adding more government
regulation can help. Collecting data on hedge fund balance sheets, for example, would be
futile, since the data would probably be obsolete before the ink dried. . . . I have been dealing with
financial market reports [within private equity funds] for almost six decades. I would not be able to
judge from such reports whether concentrations of positions reflected markets in the process of doing
what they are supposed to do or whether some dangerous trading was emerging. I would truly be
surprised if anyone could.”).
61
Mark Shields, The Verdict is In on Deregulation, LEDGER ENQUIRER, June 6, 2009,
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/sunday_voices/story/740725.html; John Gard, Economic Crisis Marks
Final Verdict on Deregulation Policies Championed, HIGHBEAM, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1569171261.html.
62
ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 203–33 (2000).
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63

speculation before they reach systemic proportions.
Accordingly, while the country’s real estate prices were overheating
and the mortgage lending industry was negligently successful, Shiller
responded in 2008 by writing a book entitled The Subprime Solution: How
Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened and What To Do About It. In
his book, Shiller called for a complete restructuring of the country’s
financial systems.64 According to this line of thinking, the mortgage
lending system overhaul should begin with increased regulation,
legislation, and oversight.
3. The Dilemma: Finding Middle Ground and Moving Forward
One of the dilemmas that has consistently stagnated mortgage reform
in the United States is that there are such stark differences in fundamental
beliefs about how to make the industry more efficient and less volatile.
These opposing opinions have stalemated mortgage reform for decades. In
fact, mortgage reform has been largely unsuccessful and unpopular until
recent years.
Part of the genius of a two-party system is that there is usually a
middle ground that opposing schools of thought can agree upon in order to
move forward with reform. Fortunately, with mortgage reform, the
traditionally narrow middle ground may be temporarily broadening in light
of the recent catastrophic financial issues now facing the country. A prime
example is the fact that some staunch deregulators are gravitating toward
the middle.65 In early November of 2008, Alan Greenspan testified before
the House Committee that he had perhaps been wrong to rely on the selfcorrecting ability of the free market—particularly in regard to wanton
mortgage spending.66 When Greenspan was asked if he thought he had
been wrong about promoting deregulation for nearly two decades, he
answered by admitting “partially.”67
Thus, just as in the days of the Great Depression, catastrophe has
ripened sentiment to pursue significant reform of a system that is obviously
in great need of it. Formerly opposing parties are beginning to agree on
the few fundamental elements of successful mortgage reform: that is to say
63

Id.
SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 221, at 107–69 (proposing that Congress instigate
several programs, including (1) a new organization modeled after the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
established in 1933; (2) a new information infrastructure (including improved financial disclosure of
mortgage backed securities); (3) “new markets” to increase real estate liquidity (including a residential
home-price futures market); and (4) new retail risk management institutions (including home equity
insurance).
65
Andrews, supra note 3.
66
Id. (“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect
shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief . . . . Yes, I’ve found a flaw [in
my past ideology and logic]. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very
distressed by that fact.”).
67
Id.
64
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there is widespread agreement that some regulation should be added, that
capital reserves are absolutely necessary,68 and that insurance is needed to
protect the taxpayer from being the primary insurer.69 The next step is to
create an agreeable reformative framework upon which both regulatory
agendas and deregulatory agendas can agree.
III. GUIDELINES FOR A WORKABLE SOLUTION
Before proposing a solution to the current financial calamity, it is
helpful to first outline the general characteristics of a plan that would best
resolve the problems that exist to avoid a similar crisis in the future. This
section proposes three basic and general characteristics that represent a
non-radical middle ground that could be adopted by both deregulators and
regulators alike.
A. The Solution Must Target Mortgage Reform
As the previous section made clear, many of the country’s financial
problems stem from loose lending statutes that allowed irresponsible
lending practices, which precipitated naïve, foolish, or selfish mortgages.
Lending laws have evolved slowly because mortgage law has been
primarily a state responsibility.70 Even though the day-to-day oversight of
mortgage lending has been primarily governed by individual state law,
during the last half-century Congress has begun to impose a few broad
restrictions that have served as benchmarks, or industry minimum
standards. Unfortunately, these broad federal benchmarks were not
sufficient to screen fraudulent lending, creative financing, subprime
lending, and even predatory lending. It would seem that the federal
statutory benchmarks must be increased in order to be effective in today’s
modern economy. This section briefly outlines each of the major federal
mortgage lending laws and provides a few reasons for reforming—or at
least extending—each of these federal benchmarks.
1. The Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) was enacted by Congress in 1968
to achieve greater transparency in lending laws.71 Congress hoped that
“economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the
various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.”72
68
Congress recently conceded the need for capital reserves by accepting Secretary Paulson’s
radical trillion-dollar plan to bailout Wall Street.
69
Jonathan Koppell, A Failure Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A27.
70
See infra Part III.B.2.
71
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
72
Id.

2009]

ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM

337

Since 1968, additional regulations were added to the Act, most notably,
Regulation Z.73 The main thrust of Regulation Z was to provide increased
disclosure to assist consumers in deciding between varying types of loans.
This increased transparency provided increased consumer education and
made significant steps toward preventing loan fraud. According to
Regulation Z, the lender must disclose the federal annual percentage rate
(“APR”), disclose finance charge requirements, adhere to credit provisions,
provide rights of rescission, and adhere to stricter advertising schemes.74
Perhaps the most popular provision is the borrowers right to rescission
within three days of signing the loan documents—also known as the
“buyer’s remorse provision.”75
While TILA has provided many useful foundational guidelines for
requiring creditors to disclose the costs of credit, it does not sufficiently
warn borrowers about the intricacies of mortgage financing.76 Admittedly,
the lending process is complicated and ensuring that mortgagors are fully
informed would be a daunting task. However, other industries have begun
to provide innovative means for informing consumers. For example, some
student loans explain terms and obligations by video; other student loans
teach by testing the loan applicant’s understanding during each segment of
the educational process. Less expensive student loan tutorials provide
reading material accompanied by a similar exam format. Likewise, TILA
could be modernized to move from passively disclosing lender information
to actively teaching the consumer. A heightened comprehension standard
imposed by the federal government would lead the mortgage industry to
take steps toward achieving the increased conventional wisdom that Shiller
predicted would work to slow irresponsible investing.77
2. The Real Estate Settlement Act
The Real Estate Settlement Act (“RESPA”) was created by Congress
in order to accomplish two goals: first, to ensure that consumers would be
provided with “greater and more timely information on the nature and
costs of the settlement process” and second, to protect consumers from
unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by “certain abusive
practices” that had developed all over the country.78 The regulations
enumerated in RESPA fall under four primary categories: (1) to require
73

12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2009).
Id.
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Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000).
76
Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability for
Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
151, 173 (2005) (“The statute requires creditors to provide borrowers with standard disclosures
regarding the costs of credit. However, TILA was not created to respond to the deceptive and abusive
practices which developed specifically in the home-equity market.”)
77
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 62, at 224–33.
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The Real Estate Settlement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
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disclosure prior to the day of the closing; (2) to eliminate kickbacks and
referral fees that cross industries and undermine client representation; (3)
to reduce the escrow amounts required for taxes and insurance; and (4) to
increase lender recordkeeping to facilitate transparency.79 Among the most
well-known of the RESPA requirements is that the lender must provide
each buyer with a previously-prepared government agency booklet.80
Also, the lender must include a good faith estimate the specific charges the
borrower is likely to incur should he or she determine that the loan is
satisfactory.81 The statute also requires that a Uniform Settlement
Statement (“HUD form”) be provided to “conspicuously and clearly
itemize all charges imposed upon both the borrower and all charges
imposed upon the seller, in connection with the settlement.”82
While RESPA includes many notable requirements, it fails to
specifically curb questionable fees and practices that commonly deceive
buyers—particularly subprime buyers. Among the questionable practices
that have managed to slip through the cracks of RESPA is the yield
spread—a bonus paid to lenders for selling higher rates which is often not
disclosed to the consumer. Additionally, policing of RESPA requirements
is rare; for example, closing documents are often prepared the day of
settlement, leaving insufficient time for meaningful disclosure of all the
facts.
3. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) was
adopted by Congress in 1994.83 HOEPA was established primarily to
combat predatory lending.84 The law prohibits loans from including
certain abusive terms, and also expands TILA’s disclosure requirements.
Unlike TILA, which applies to every residential mortgage loan, HOEPA
applies only to a certain class of “High Cost Mortgages.”85 Under
HOEPA, certain problematic mortgages trigger red flags which require
heightened regulation and disclosure requirements. These triggers include:
(1) high-cost mortgages, negative amortization loans, or zero interest
loans; (2) loans that subject the borrower to high cost late payments; (3)
loans that have high-penalty interest rates; (4) loans that include balloon
79

Id.
Id. § 2604(a)–(b).
81
Id. § 2604(c).
82
Id. § 2603. This form was later created by the division of Housing and Urban Development
and came to be known as the HUD form. Ironically, the government-established HUD form is less than
intuitive and arguably not conspicuous about back end fees and kickbacks that do not directly affect the
buyer or seller’s bottom line. See infra Part IV.B.2. (discussing the covert “yield spread premium” and
its indirect effect on the borrower’s monthly payments).
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The Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
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payments beyond five years; and (5) loans to candidates that are qualified
strictly by collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to make the
predetermined payments.86
While many of the provisions are significant, a major criticism of
HOEPA is that the triggers are not inclusive enough to stop most predatory
lending that occurred throughout the subprime lending crisis and that the
statute of limitations is too limiting.87 As a result, HOEPA did not have
enough “teeth” for most loans and allowed the extensive predatory lending
to occur under the radar of the HOEPA “trigger requirements.”
4. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 was passed by Congress as Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act.88 This act requires owners, sellers, landlords, and
maintenance companies to give equal opportunity to all classes of people
in the housing market.89 The focus of the statute is to provide equal rights
for those seeking to purchase or rent real property, access broker
representation, and utilize marketing services. The statute specifically
protects individuals of different “race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin.”90
From a general perspective, this statute has provided significant
protection for the classes defined therein. However, in the mortgage
lending industry specifically, minorities are often the target for egregious
subprime loans, termed by some as predatory loans. In fact, fifty percent
of all subprime loans were issued within African American neighborhoods
as compared to only nine percent in neighborhoods where whites were the
majority.91 Admittedly, Congress has worked to update some of these
86
15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(a)–(c), (h); Emily Jeffcott, The Mortgage Reform and Anti Predatory Act of
2007: Paving a Secure Path for Minorities in the Midst of the Sub Prime Debacle, 10 ST. MARY’S L.
REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 449, 465–68 (2008).
87
Keyfetz, supra note 76, at 189–90. Moreover:
HOEPA’s triggers, which are either set far above market interest rates, or are
incredibly difficult to calculate, and therefore only capture a small percentage of the
subprime home equity loan market. . . . [T]he statute contains several significant
limitations: (1) A one-year statute of limitations for damages and three-year statute
of limitations for rescission; (2) HOEPA’s strict liability rescission remedy only
applies to violations of HOEPA, rather than to “all claims and defenses” for the
damages remedy; and (3) HOEPA’s augmented due diligence requirement is
ambiguous. In part, these limitations resulted unintentionally from sloppily drafting
HOEPA within TILA’s existing structural and remedial scheme. At the same time,
the limitations were intentional compromises between advocates for borrowers and
lenders. Either way, these limitations, along with HOEPA’s very high triggers, have
combined to leave few borrowers with the ability to take advantage of the rights
created by HOEPA’s assignee liability provisions.
Id.
88
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2006).
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Id. § 3604.
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Id.
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Jeffcott, supra note 86, at 498 (“In totality, the subprime lending market has caused not only
enormous damage to minorities and their communities, but also significant damage to the world
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older federal laws in order to deal with predatory lending and egregious
subprime lending.92 But, these proposals offer only minor changes in
specific products or limited practice areas. Additionally, current proposals
for mortgage reform offer solutions with little to no federal infrastructure
to provide centralized oversight, regulation, and follow up.
B. The Solution Should Be Administered on the Federal Level
The argument over which level of government should regulate each
aspect of American life began during the 1700s and has persisted in
politics to this day. The controversy over whether the federal or state
governments should oversee mortgage reform has received similar
attention.93 While Congress has enumerated many broad mortgage
regulations, critics maintain that these restraints have not been specific or
expansive enough to curb the widespread predatory lending, irresponsible
buying, and unjustified speculation.94 In an effort to fill the federal
regulatory gaps, some states have become increasingly aggressive in
regulating the industry, and as a result—for example—approximately half
of the states have developed some type of legislation to combat predatory
lending.95 In light of the nationwide financial crisis of 2008—which
arguably stemmed from the country’s inadequate mortgage regulation—the
question of whether Congress should take additional regulatory steps, or
leave the individual states to regulate, has become especially pressing.
Perhaps the most important question in determining whether state or
federal jurisdiction should head mortgage reform is the one posed by
market. Because state regulation is limited, it is necessary to promulgate effective federal legislation
that will tackle the roots and continuing effects of subprime lending.”).
92
In October of 2007, Bradley Miller sponsored a bill to amend TILA called the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act which was designed to address many predatory lending
problems that occurred during the previous decade since TILA. The Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d110:4:./temp/~bdEcWL:@@@
D&summ2=m&|/bss/d110query.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). In May of 2007, the Senate briefly
considered and sent to committee another bill named the Borrower’s Protection Act (“BPA”). The
BPA attempts to establish a fiduciary duty between the mortgage broker and borrower in order to
protect the borrower. The bill also established standards for assessing whether or not a borrower has
the ability and financial capacity to repay a loan.
The Borrower’s Protection Act,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1299is.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008).
93
See Lloyd Wilson, Sometimes Less Is More: Utility, Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms
of Proposed Federal Regulation of Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV 62, 62 (2007) (“Regulatory
responses to predatory lending have from the outset raised two interrelated questions: What kinds of
regulations will best combat predatory lending and Who should enact those regulations? The former
question asks what types of loan terms and lending practices should be proscribed or prescribed; the
latter question asks which level of government, federal or state, is in the better position to make the
policy judgments that inform the regulation of mortgage lending activities.”).
94
See supra Part III.A. (describing current federal mortgage laws and outlining some
inefficiencies and shortcomings); see also Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2005).
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Peterson, supra note 94, at 5.
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Christopher Peterson:
Is [] lending [reform] most akin to family law, criminal law,
and small purely local commercial ventures, and therefore,
most appropriately addressed by the states? Or, does []
lending more closely resemble foreign policy or interstate
commerce and, accordingly, merit federal oversight? Or
finally, is this a mixed-federal question deserving of shared
responsibility?96
Some hold that relying on states to regulate mortgage lending has
created a dizzyingly disparate patchwork of regulatory practices that has
failed to ensure consistent consumer protection.97 Conversely, others insist
that federal attempts to regulate the mortgage industry through preemptive
efforts have backfired and effectively worked to deregulate mortgage law
in states that have made progressive strides toward mortgage reform.98
The result—for the time being—is that mortgage regulation has become a
delicate mixture of both federal and state oversight. This framework for
legislation has caused state and federal authorities to point fingers at one
another to take action, and has resulted in sluggish reform. This Note
asserts that mortgage reform should be advanced by the central-federal
government.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
Three landmark cases help provide a foundation and framework for
any discussion dealing with whether to limit or expand federal legislative
authority. In the first case, McCulloch v. Maryland the Supreme Court
considered whether Congress had authority to create a federal bank and
whether Maryland had the power to tax that bank.99 The former
question—most pertinent to this Note’s proposal to create a Federal
Mortgage Insurance Corporation—was answered by Justice Marshall who
outlined four arguments supporting Congress’ authority to charter a federal
bank: (1) Congress had authority because of precedent stemming from the
fact that it was a power previously used; (2) Congress had authority
because states did not retain ultimate sovereignty evidenced in their
ratification of the Constitution; (3) Congress had authority because the
Constitution provided broad powers to Congress to enable it to perform in
96
Id. at 8 (discussing a series of questions about mortgage regulation that the author believes are
important and pressing. Peterson, however, did not presume to answer the question: “I take no position
on the level of government from which predatory lending policy should emanate.”).
97
See Jeffcott, supra note 86, at 455–56 (“The current legislation aimed at regulating subprime
lending and preventing predatory lending has proven largely ineffective. . . . Because these statutes
have not provided the necessary protection to borrowers, states have been forced to enact their own
anti-predatory legislation, which has resulted in highly uneven practices among the states.”).
98
See Peterson, supra note 94, at 8.
99
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
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a multitude of varying circumstances; and (4) Congress had authority
under the necessary and proper clause.100 The McCulloch decision helped
set early precedent for construing congressional powers broadly, allowing
Congress to intervene where activities had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.101 This broad construction of the Constitution continued into
the twentieth century.102 In fact, between 1937 and 1995 the Supreme
Court did not find a single congressional statutory enactment outside
constitutional limitations.103
It was not until 1995 that the Supreme Court began taking steps to
restrain Congress’s power to legislate under the commerce power. In
United States v. Lopez, the court considered whether Congress had
authority to legislate the “Gun-Free School Zones Act” under the
commerce clause.104 The court identified three categories of activities that
Congress had power to regulate under the commerce clause: (1) the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of commerce;
and (3) activities that have a “substantial relation” to commerce among the
several states.105 While Lopez narrowed congressional legislative power
under the commerce clause, the Court emphasized that the primary reason
for the narrowing was because the statute dealt with matters that did not
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.106 Along this vein, there is no
question that the past mortgage crisis substantially affected interstate
commerce.
Another case that may provide some indication of the Supreme Court’s
perspective on Congress’ ability to legislate mortgage matters is United
States v. Perez.107 In Perez, the defendant—a lending institution—claimed
that Title II of the Consumer Protection Act was not constitutional because
Congress did not have authority to regulate the lending of intrastate
money.108 The Court countered that Congress had the authority because
certain types of loans––though traditionally local––had a national affect.109
Assuming that there is a rational basis for Congress to believe that
mortgage lending activities have a sufficient effect on intrastate commerce,
the argument for centralized reform is strong. Even though commerce
clause arguments against centralized reform are relatively weak, there are
several policy arguments—both supporting and opposing centralized
100
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 233–37 (2d ed.
2002); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 410–17.
101
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 232.
102
Id. at 234.
103
Id.
104
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
105
Id. at 558–59.
106
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 266.
107
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
108
Id. at 146–47.
109
Id. at 156–57.
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reform—that may transcend the issue of whether congress has the power or
not.
2. The Argument for State-Based Regulation
One argument for state based legislation asserts that, to date,
Congress’s mortgage preemption statutes have proven largely ineffective
because they are proposed under the guise of federalism when the
underlying action is destructive deregulation.110 This argument suggests
that bipartisan politics favoring deregulation, under the pretense of
federalism, have waylaid Congress from enacting mortgage reform with
strong utility.111 Thus, many of the federal preemptive laws are without
force and end up providing the mortgage industry with more latitude than
the states originally provided. In this way, federal mortgage legislation can
be—and arguably has been—more destructive than helpful.
Another argument is founded on the idea that the states have a greater
capacity to legislate for the needs and intricacies of their own complicated
economies than Congress.112 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that pure federalism—state-based regulation—increased the
opportunity for citizens to be involved in the democratic processes.113
Scholars in this camp insist that government regulation on a smaller scale
increases communication between the elected officials writing the statutes
and the citizens that are affected by the ensuing laws.114 This line of
reasoning provides justification for the relatively lax mortgage laws in
states that sold less real estate during the destructive subprime era while
simultaneously justifying the stringent subprime laws in states that had a
five-hundred percent increase in subprime lending during 2000–06.115 In
this way, states with different characteristics can retain the ability to pass
varying degrees of mortgage regulation.
Another argument assumes that allowing individual states to create
separate mortgage laws provides the most effective means of
experimenting with new law. Supporters of this reasoning assert that the
state legislative-laboratory is the crowning virtue of federalism.116 This
argument also provides that state level decision making is less stifled and
110

Peterson, supra note 94, at 8.
Id.
See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 392 (2005)
(“[The] value of federalism is that it promotes the democratic ideal because state governments are more
closely in tune with their citizens and therefore more accountable and responsive to local constituent
needs.”).
113
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Azmy, supra note 112, at 392.
114
Azmy, supra note 112, at 391–92.
115
Id. at 301.
116
See id. at 390–93 (explaining that the state laboratory is the best forum for legislation; but, this
argument assumes that regulation from the top down—federal—is tailored to preempt the more
effective, fair, and efficient result that is inevitably discovered through the state trial and error process).
111
112
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thus more innovative and open to experimentation. Justice Brandeis stated
that federal efforts to trump individual state experimentation would have
an adverse affect on the innovation and success of the federal system; that
the state laboratories provide risk management in preparing, conceiving,
and cultivating law that can be later implemented on a federal level.117
Supporters of a state based regime insist that even if federal legislation is
the answer, it should be stayed for several years or even decades in order to
allow for further evaluation and reflection on varying state reforms
currently in flux.118
And, finally, there is the age-old argument first posed by early antifederalists—supporters of a decentralized government as originally
instituted in the Articles of Confederation—that state governments are an
important check on the central government and minimize the “likelihood of
tyranny” in mortgage reform.119
3. The Argument for Federal Based Regulation
Despite persuasive arguments for state-based regulation, the several
arguments supporting centralized federal reform within the mortgage
industry prove more convincing. First, state legislation is a slow process
and does not provide the requisite nationwide solutions to curtail a
widespread meltdown of the nation’s economic framework. This has been
especially evident during the latter half of 2008. Though many states
began altering mortgage laws as early as 2000, no single state’s actions
were enough to prevent the country’s widespread market crisis.120 The
original Framers knew that complete sovereignty of states would be a slow
and ineffective way to govern the country and thus, after just ten years
under the Articles of Confederation—the ultimate federalist regime—the
states ventured to create a centralized government to regulate, govern,
negotiate, tax, and legislate.
Second, history has shown that an industry can be more stable and
simultaneously increase in efficiency when the federal government
provides capital reserves. For example, the general success of the FDIC
and the Fed as stabilizers of our increasingly complex economy is evident.
117

Id. at 301 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J.,
dissenting)).
118
Id. at 393–94 (“[N]o uniform national solution should be imposed until more data is available
to evaluate whether the state reforms have worked or will work. More specifically, evaluation factors
should include: (i) whether the variety of state options have worked in their jurisdictions to ameliorate
predatory lending or whether unscrupulous lenders have been successful, as they often are, in
circumventing state restrictions and (ii) whether state laws have been or would be counterproductive, as
the banking industry has suggested, by increasing compliance costs and liability risks to greatly that
legitimate subprime credit is driven out of the communities which the predatory lending laws were
intended to help.”).
119
Id. at 391.
120
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing individual state reform, obviously none
of which stayed the market crisis during 2008).
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Both of these institutions have the ability to provide funds in times of
economic volatility and turmoil and each successfully functions in its role
to stabilize the economy.121 On one hand, from a utilitarian perspective, it
is wise to leverage federalist ideals and allow states to develop innovative
and original legislation by trial and error. On the other hand, it is
important for Congress to evaluate and implement the tried and proven
state mortgage laws on a national scale. Major mortgage reform was first
implemented following the depression and has since had nearly eighty
years of state reformation. Now, in the wake of significant need for
nationwide mortgage reform, Congress should use its authority to build on
past regulatory ideas (e.g., TILA, HOEPA, FHA), past state innovations in
mortgage law, and past modes of insurance (e.g., FDIC, FHA,VA) to
provide a solution (e.g., the FMIC).
Third, federal legislation would provide consistency where different
state governments currently vary significantly, a problem that exposes
some consumers to “under-protection” and others to “overprotection.”122
Consider for example, that while some states have “acknowledged that
lending abuses are occurring within their borders” they have still not
adopted the necessary laws.123 In contrast, other states have enacted laws
that have been so restrictive that lenders have become reluctant to move
forward with any type of subprime loans—thus ostracizing the state’s
subprime borrowers.124 A well-considered centralized regulatory regime,
constructed with past federal laws and programs, would establish a
stronger and more consistent foundation for customized state regulation.
Therefore, there is little question about whether Congress has the
“constitutional power” to lead-out in mortgage reform. And, though there
are several strong arguments for allowing states to continue leading out in
mortgage reform, the magnitude of the recent mortgage crisis has dimmed
the luster of the federalist ideal championing decentralized mortgage
regulation. The mortgage lending industry has proven during 2008 that it
needs significant reform, consistent interstate regulation, and large
centralized capital reserves in order to be reliable and self-sustaining.
C. The Solution Must Be Capable of Providing Large Amounts of Capital
There are dozens of ways to stabilize an industry through regulation,
oversight, and risk management, but when calamity strikes, industries
require access to capital reserves. Most agree that a sharp downturn in a
121
Sheila Bair, FDIC Chairman, Address at the 75th Anniversary Kick Off Press Conference,
(June 16, 2008), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spjun
1708.html (“Since the FDIC was created, there have been no significant bank runs.”).
122
Azmy, supra note 112, at 374–78.
123
Id. at 376–77.
124
Id. at 378.
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market—as a result of a housing market bubble collapse, for example—is
most effectively dealt with by an injection of capital; however, the question
of where that capital should come from is a different matter.125 The bank
run of 1907, the Great Depression, the stock market crash of 1987, the dot
com crash of 2000, the Japan Crisis, and Mexico’s Peso Crisis all attest to
the fact that capital reserves can be the best solution when systemic
calamity is inevitable.126 Lawmakers, scholars, industry professionals, and
the nation’s taxpayers are left to decide on the source from which the
money should come. Is the best solution to have the government bail out
financial intermediaries like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when the market
plummets? Is the answer to have every financial intermediary morph into
a bank holding company (insured by the FDIC) and allow access to
consumer deposits and the Fed’s discount window?127 Whether capital
comes from a government bailout or whether insurance companies are
formerly set up to mitigate risk, history has shown that a struggling
125
FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 79–86, 91 (arguing that one of the greatest mistakes during the
Great Depression was the Federal Reserve’s hesitation to inject capital into the market); Press Release,
Financial Services Agency, Global Financial Crisis and Japan’s Experience in the 1990s (Oct. 25,
2008), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20081025.html.
126
The Japan Crisis and the Mexico Peso Crisis have been repeatedly cited by United States’
economists as quintessential examples of the positive effects of large-scale capital infusion during
times of systemic calamity. See Martin Fackler, In Japan, Financial Crisis is Just a Ripple, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C4; see also Dr. Takafumi Sato, Comm’r of the Fin. Servs. Agency, Remarks
at the Symposium on Building the Financial System of the 21st Century (Oct. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20081025.html. Describing similarities to the U.S. economic
crisis and the Japan economic crisis, the Commissioner of Financial Services offered this opinion:
[U]ndercapitalization of financial firms needs to be addressed, by injecting public
funds if necessary. Prompt and sufficient recapitalization is needed if a financial
firm becomes undercapitalized as a result of the disposal of bad assets. In cases
where a sufficient amount of capital cannot be raised on a market basis,
recapitalization with public funds is effective as a final safety net. While capital
injection does put taxpayers’ money at risk, it may end up with benefiting taxpayers
if successful. In Japan, the government injected 12.4 trillion yen in 37 banks, of
which 9.2 trillion yen has already been repaid, of which capital gains amount to 1.3
trillion yen. These are on top of a cumulative dividend income of 770 billion yen as
of end-March 2008. In this respect, I welcome the decision of the U.S. government
to commit 250 billion dollars to recapitalize the financial firms. At the same time,
the authorities should be flexible in responding to new, additional developments.
Losses could grow further, because the adverse effect of the deteriorating real
economy could hit financial firms if a substantial amount of bad assets remain on
their balance sheets.
Id.; see also Edwin M. Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for International Finance,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 199–205 (Mar. 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/bulletin/1996/396lead.pdf (discussing the decision by Congress to contribute up to $40 billion to
stop the financial bleeding in Mexico during the 1994 Mexico Peso Crisis).
127
See Jones, supra note 47 (discussing that as a result of the financial crisis, several major
companies—Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and American Express—have become bank holding
companies in order to take advantage of the insurance offered to depositors through the FDIC. This
change in entity type allows the corporation to more easily access depositor’s money. Additionally, as
a bank holding company, the federal government insures the depositor financing so the process of
obtaining capital is not as volatile as the investor market—and certainly a more reliable avenue for
income during economic turmoil. Also, companies that morph into bank holding companies can take
advantage of the TARP plan and the Federal Reserve’s discount window.).
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industry can usually gain footing as long as it has access to capital.
Conversely, history has also shown that large companies and industries
that face an economic downturn coupled with clogged capital flow, fail.128
In the words of prominent economist Milton Freedman: in times of crisis
the key is “expanding the money supply.”129 From a historical perspective,
when a large and indispensible industry has failed—such as the mortgage
lending industry—the central government has been forced to provide
capital.
One way to create emergency capital is to force big companies to pay
for their own insurance in the form of a “failure tax.” In a recent New York
Times article, Jonathan Koppell opined that “the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury Department are acting like insurance claims adjusters, selectively
providing assistance when a company’s failure seems too much for the
financial markets to withstand.”130 As a result, Koppell suggested that
investment banks and other large companies should be required to pay
premiums for catastrophic risk insurance, similar to government imposed
flood, bank, and crop insurance.131 Koppell proposed that the concept of
imposing an insurance premium on big companies should be appropriately
named the “failure tax.”132 Koppell’s idea may be worth debating because,
after all, the government’s $700 billion bail-out plan is a type of “failure
tax” for big corporations—with premiums imposed on all the wrong
people.
The truth is that Koppell’s idea is not all that novel.
Congressmen, who lived through the Great Depression and felt the adverse
effects of market illiquidity, created the FDIC insurance program to
provide the very type of industry insurance Koppell called for in his article.
Similarly, many of those same lawmakers established the FHA insurance
program to promote market confidence and lender reserves.133
A second method for building catastrophic capital reserves would to
force individual lending institutions to increase their reserves. This
regulatory regime could emulate the relatively new banking regulations set
forth under Basel II.134 Through the creation of Basel II, several prominent
countries agreed to require their banks to carry a certain percentage of
capital for each asset, depending on how that asset was weighted on an

128

Andrew Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all.
129
FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 70–79.
130
Koppell, supra note 69.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Additionally, lawmakers who suffered through the bank run of 1907 formulated the Federal
Reserve to be a lender of last resort.
134
Press Release, OCC Approves Basel II Capital Rule (Nov. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2007-123.htm.
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index that determined general risk levels.
The index requires banks to
weigh credit risk, market risk, operational risk, interest rate risk, and
liquidity risk—against capital reserves.136
It is no secret that the federal charter for Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie
requires a similar kind of risk based capital requirement, but these
requirements are obviously not sufficient in light of the recent government
bailout. The problem with simply doubling the risk based capital
requirement for mortgage lending institutions nationwide is the
impracticability and wasteful result of requiring several trillion dollars be
set aside in a savings account to hedge against risk. More money being set
aside means fewer loans, fewer homeowners, and inefficient lending.
A third method for creating catastrophic financial reserves would be to
use the full faith and credit of the U.S. government as the source of capital.
In effect, this is the model that the country has been using. As previously
noted, this model socializes risk and privatizes profits: it effectively creates
moral hazard.
Finally, another way to create emergency capital may be by morphing
the concept of the “failure tax” into a federal-government-required
insurance program. Emergency capital reserves can be best realized by
requiring institutions to pay for their own insurance: industry paid
insurance is resourceful, fair to the taxpayer, and effective as an opponent
of risk. The FDIC is a prime example of the practice of these principles.
Banking institutions contribute a small percent of each deposit to the FDIC
and the insurance entity agrees to take on the liability should the company
require financial assistance. While the insurance is for the depositor, the
institutions—which create the systemic risk—are the primary parties
responsible for paying the premium.137 Insurance premiums trend upward
as a result of increased risk; thus fundamental insurance principles deter
moral hazard (as opposed to government bailouts that increase moral
hazard). Importantly, paying insurance premiums would not require
companies or industries to excessively gather cash in order to hedge
against risk. The Institutions that would potentially utilize the funds would
be paying for the “capital reserve,” and thus notions of equity would be
135
Id. at 8 (“Capital helps protect individual banks from insolvency, thereby promoting safety and
soundness in the overall U.S. banking system. Minimum risk-based capital requirements establish a
threshold below which a sound bank’s risk-based capital must not fall. Risk-based capital ratios permit
some comparative analysis of capital adequacy across banks because they are based on certain common
assumptions. However, supervisors must perform a more comprehensive review of capital adequacy
that considers the risks that are specific to each individual bank, including those not incorporated in
risk-based capital requirements. In short, supervisors must ensure that a bank’s overall capital does not
fall below the level required to support its entire risk profile.”).
136
Id. at 8–18.
137
There are two ways to consider how the insurance “expense” is paid. From the less obvious
perspective, the payment is internalized by the depositor in light of the fact that decreased interest rates
available on deposits into the institution are the ultimate result of the FDIC expense.
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served.
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
The United States’ legal framework for mortgage lending is
insufficient: oversight is sporadic, state laws are inconsistent, federal laws
are inadequate, lenders and banks are under-insured, and the federal
government has erroneously become the primary insurer. This section
proposes that the federal government create a centralized entity to regulate,
oversee, and insure the nationwide mortgage industry: the entity could be
appropriately named the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation
(“FMIC”). The FMIC could be required to meet all the ideals set forth in
the previous sections,138 by providing mortgage reform, industry stability,
capital reserves, and uniform federal mortgage lending laws. The next two
sections outline how this entity could function and the benefits it would
potentially provide the lending industry.
A. Capital Reserves by Insurance
Assuming that the mortgage industry would benefit from capital
reserves derived from insurance during a time of financial crisis—as
discussed in the previous section139—the natural ensuing question would
be, “Who would pay for the insurance, and how would the FMIC manage
the insurance program?”
To answer the question, it is important to note that some mortgage
loans are already insured. That said, most mortgage debt in the country is
not insured. Several different entities and industries have provided
insurance for mortgage loans during the past century. First, the FHA,
created during the Great Depression, currently insures some first-timehomebuyer loans that meet certain criteria.140 Second, the Veterans
Administration (“VA”) insures some mortgage home loans for those who
have participated in the military.141 Third, the PMI industry insures the
greatest number of home loans in the country; but this insurance covers
only twenty percent of the loan amount.142 Finally, the recently enacted
Hope for Homeowners (“HFH”) legislation retroactively insures distressed
homeowner mortgages where lenders are willing to write down a portion
of the principle—though this program has only been marginally

138
See supra Part III (discussing the three ideal guidelines for a solution: mortgage reform,
federally based guidelines, and large capital reserves).
139
See supra Part III (discussing guidelines for a solution).
140
About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73,
1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited July 29, 2009).
141
Department of Veteran Affairs, http://www.va.gov/about_va (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
142
MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14.
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successful.
The industry’s massive requirements for capital during a
large market failure—such as that which occurred during 2008—cannot
likely be serviced through any of these entities (or industries) because of
the limited goals and scope of each. The following subsections describe
the insurance characteristics of the FMIC.
1. FMIC to Insure Loans Exceeding Fifty Percent of Property Values
In order to properly curb the systemic risk posed by the mortgage
industry, the FMIC must provide insurance for at least fifty percent of
mortgage loan amount. As stated earlier, most home loans are not fully
insured, but among the home-loans currently insured, most are covered by
the PMI industry. Unfortunately, the private insurance industry only
provides insurance for between five to twenty percent of the full loan
amount.144 While this protection provides relative mortgage lender support
in most market conditions, recent real estate bubble deflation in several
states—including California and Florida—has reached nearly forty percent
value declines.145 After making interest payments, paying attorney costs,
and absorbing losses due to under-maintenance, banks in 2008 were losing
an average of forty-four percent of the mortgage loan amount.146 Thus,
losses on privately insured assets far outweighed private mortgage
insurance compensation.147
Thus, the federal government should require the FMIC insurance on all
home loans that exceed fifty percent loan to value (“LTV”).148 This
143
Paletta et al., supra note 26 (discussing the marginal success of the Hope for Homeowners
program that was initiated in an effort to slow foreclosures, but requires the lender to take losses up
front).
144
MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14.
145
Brad Davidson, Median Price Heading South of 400K, Oct. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.socalbubble.com/ (“The median price continues to fall and if the trend holds it should be
under $400,000 by year’s end. That will be close to a forty percent decline.”).
146
Paletta et al., supra note 26. To reiterate the need for extensive mortgage industry insurance,
common sense shows that a precipitous fall in housing prices (a bubble burst as a result of irrational
exuberance) could easily trigger each of the factors that would inevitably lead to widespread market
failure. The cycle begins with a (1) drop in housing prices (2) that increases foreclosures (3) and
increases the average losses by lenders in each foreclosure, (4) the banks panic and cut back lending,
(5) real estate sales slow, (6) housing prices drop further, (7) and the cycle continues. Thus, each
housing bubble that reaches sufficient magnitude will inevitably lead to secondary market failure as
long as proper insurance (or an alternative capital reserve) is not in place.
147
There are other ways to “insure” a loan not evaluated in this Note. Some banks allow the
borrower to leverage one hundred percent of the mortgage value while as long as the first loan for
eighty percent remains in “primary position.” In this scenario, the mortgagor is able to obtain a twenty
percent loan from a second institution at a much higher interest rate. This “80/20” loan structure puts
the secondary market investor in essentially the same position as though the mortgagor had purchased
twenty percent private mortgage insurance. This loan structure is acceptable under Fannie Mae’s
charter. But, this “insurance” proved similarly insufficient during 2008, when the average foreclosure
cost in the nation rose to forty-four percent of the loan amount—more than double the “insured”
(secondary loan) amount.
148
For example, consider three hypothetical buyers that each purchase three different houses on
the same street for $100,000: Buyer A, Buyer B, and Buyer C. A pays $100,000 in cash. A is exempt
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insurance would not be required on homes with forty-nine percent LTV or
less. Similar to the government standards currently imposed on the PMI
and FHA programs, the FMIC insurance payments and coverage would
automatically cease once the LTV dropped below fifty percent.149
2. FMIC to Insure All Qualifying Loans
In order to provide a meaningful capital reserve, the FMIC must insure
all loans that exceed fifty percent loan to value. This characteristic of the
FMIC is an important addition to the previous section in light of the fact
that the government already provides “one hundred percent insurance” for
home loans that qualify through the FHA. But, because of stringent FHA
borrower requirements, the FHA only insures a small portion of the home
loan industry: the FHA insures approximately $680 billion of the $13
trillion in outstanding mortgage debt.150 Stated differently, the FHA
insures approximately five percent of the nation’s mortgage debt.151
However, the relatively small number of FHA insured loans have not been
an indication of the program’s success in its sphere. The FHA has not
aspired to be a large institution in order to provide support against systemic
risk.152 In fact, FHA and VA loans purposefully exclude many prime
buyers in order to focus on subprime needs.153 The FHA limiting criteria
include the requirement that the mortgagor must occupy the home within
sixty days of purchase, purchase a home within the price range set by the
administration, and purchase either a single-family residence or duplex,
from contributing to the FMIC insurance premiums because she has no LTV on her house and she
poses zero risk to the lending industry. B pays $60,000 in cash and receives a loan from a lender for
$40,000. B is exempt from contributing to the FMIC insurance program because in the event that the
lender must foreclose on her house to recoup the $40,000 loan, B has $60,000 in equity—which is the
equivalent of sixty percent insurance on the loan. C pays $10,000 in cash and receives a loan for
$90,000. C must contribute to FMIC insurance premiums because if the house is foreclosed—
foreclosure costs the lender an average of forty-four percent in today’s economy—the lender will only
have the equivalent of ten percent ($10,000) insurance on the home. The FMIC would continue to
require insurance contributions until C pays another $40,000 in principal. When C only owes $50,000
on the house, the FMIC payments would stop b/c the lender could use C’s $50,000 equity as insurance
on fifty percent of the loan.
149
Current federal law requires that when the LTV reaches the private mortgage insurance
carrier’s coverage amount (traditionally twenty percent) the insurance carrier must automatically cease
billing the consumer. MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 20. This automatic trigger is a safeguard
for consumers that historically would pay for needless insurance long past its coverage, without
realizing that the insurance payment was a part of their monthly mortgage payment. This is true for
FHA insured loans as well.
150
Review and Outlook, The Next Fannie Mae: Ginnie Mae and FHA Are Becoming $1 Trillion
Subprime Guarantors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A16; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 735 (2008); Federal Housing Administration Website,
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Dec.
15, 2008).
151
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735.
152
About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=
73,1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
153
Id.
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three-plex, or four-plex.
As previously discussed, the PMI industry provides a significant
portion of the United States’ mortgage insurance. During 2007, the PMI
industry was obligated to approximately $800 billion of insurance, which
represented approximately six percent of the mortgage debt in the
country.155 Thus, after combining both the federal government insurance
and private insurance program coverage,156 most of the mortgage debt in
the country remains uninsured. During the 1980’s, the PMI industry paid
approximately six billion dollars in claims to its policyholders.157 During
the 1990’s, the PMI industry paid approximately eight billion dollars in
claims.158 During just one year—2008—industry wide losses reached
several hundred billion dollars while the mortgage insurance industry only
paid out approximately $15 billion.159 While the PMI industry is not large
enough to quell systemic risk, it has shown notable resilience during tough
economic times. The achievements of both the FHA and PMI industries
provide some testimony of the likely success that the FMIC would have if
it functioned on a larger scale. Additionally, in light of the inability of the
FHA and PMI insurance programs to quell widespread home loan
calamity, the FMIC must provide insurance for all home loans that meet
the fifty percent LTV standard in order to meaningfully curb systemic
risk.160
3. FMIC Premium Payments
There are several ways the FMIC could potentially raise funds to pay
for the government sponsored loan insurance. The most practical model
may be to require the borrower to pay a mortgage insurance premium
monthly until the LTV drops below fifty percent. The FHA program and
the PMI industry currently rely on this model to pay insurance premiums
and have shown that the payment does not prove so onerous as to deter

154
FHA.com, FHA Limits, http://www.fha.com/lending_limits_state.cfm?state=CONNECTICUT
(last visited July 29, 2009) (enumerating the restrictions on applicants that qualify for FHA insurance
including, for example, restrictions on housing prices for Hartford Connecticut: $440,000 for a single
family residence; $563,250 for a duplex; $680,850 for a triplex; and $846,150 for a four-plex).
155
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735; see also MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29,
at 23.
156
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735.
157
MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 13.
158
Id. at 14.
159
MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF AMERICA, 2009–2010 FACT BOOK & MEMBER
DIRECTORY 15 (2009–10) (discussing that in 2008, during the housing market collapse, mortgage
insurers paid out approximately $15 billion in claims); Yalman Onaran, Subprime Losses Top $379
Billion on Balance-Sheet, BLOOMBERG, May 19, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&sid=aK4Z6C2kXs3A&refer=home.
160
This concept holds true, assuming that the PMI industry does not change to accommodate fifty
percent LTV coverage, and the FHA program does not change to accommodate all home loans.
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buyers.
Not only are the premium payments palatable for the borrower,
but the government has been able to retain solvency in the FHA program
for the last several decades.162
4. FMIC Capital Reserves
To effectively avoid a future repeat of the 2008 mortgage industry
failure, the FMIC must keep reserves that exceed projected needs. Using
the example of the FHA program, the federal mortgage insurance entity
could feasibly retain reserves that allow it to remain solvent even in times
of extreme market volatility. The FHA is a mortgage insurance entity that
has shown that this is possible. On June 17, 2008 the FHA Commissioner
Brian Montgomery claimed that:
Currently, FHA is solvent. In fact, we have a reserve of
about $21 billion. However, as a result of our annual reestimate, we had to book an additional of $4.6 billion in
unanticipated long-term losses, mostly due to the increased
number of certain types of seller-funded loans in the FHA
portfolio. Let me repeat: FHA is solvent.163
The FDIC provides another example of a federally based insurance
program created primarily to provide and manage capital reserves for an
industry.164 In late 2008, the FDIC was busy managing receiverships and
brokering the acquisition of failing banks with larger stronger banks.165
This pandemic was spurred by the subprime mortgage years earlier in the
same decade: during 2005, no banks failed; during 2006, no banks failed;
during 2007, seven banks collapsed; and, during 2008, at least twelve

161

About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=
73,1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Incidentally, FHA
borrowers represent some of the most “leveraged” and “subprime” buyers in the market. This is largely
because the program focuses on providing housing for those who would not be able to qualify
otherwise—particularly in respect to saving a down payment. The success of the FHA one-hundredpercent insurance program and its monthly insurance payments are a testament to the likely success of
an FMIC required fifty-percent insurance program on all loans paid for in a similar manner.
162
Brian Montgomery, Comm’r of the FHA, Remarks at the National Press Club (June 9, 2008),
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2008-06-09.cfm.
163
Id.
164
The FDIC was created in 1933 under the Glass Steagall Act to restore confidence in the
banking system after more than 4000 banks failed.
See History of the FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/history/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). According to the Act, the
depositor insurance program was organized to safeguard against bank runs and bank failures that
helped tip off the great depression. The FDIC functions as an, “independent agency of the federal
government, [it] was created in 1933 in response to the thousands of bank failures that occurred in the
1920s and early 1930s.” Who Is the FDIC?, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2009).
165
David Evans, FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail, BLOOMBERG, Sept.
25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid+206011038&sid+amZxIbcjZISU&refer=us.
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banks failed. With so many banks struggling in 2008, the FDIC used up
its reserves—even to the extent that some economists speculated that the
FDIC would need nearly $200 billion to avoid borrowing from the
Treasury before the end of 2009.167 The FHA and the FDIC programs have
a long history of maintaining capital reserve infrastructure during tough
economic times and provide important precedent for establishing rules and
guidelines for future government entities to do the same—entities such as
the FMIC.
B. Mortgage Loan Regulation
The FMIC would most effectively regulate mortgage lenders by
applying baseline underwriting, resell, and securitization requirements.
Lenders who currently require buyers to purchase private mortgage
insurance look to the insurance carrier to set the guidelines for
underwriting their loan. In fact, the PMI industry brags that, “[m]ortgage
insurers were designed to be review underwriters. Because they are in the
first loss position on insured mortgages, they are the second set of eyes
looking at potential loans to check and see if is safe for both the investor
and the borrower.”168 This same model is utilized by the United States’
dual banking system, where both national and state banks that seek federal
insurance agree to abide by the guidelines and regulations outlined by the
FDIC. By providing federal insurance for the mortgage industry, the
FMIC could also set the minimum standards for mortgage brokers, primary
lenders, secondary lenders, and securitization. Like the FDIC, the FMIC’s
primary goal would be to provide insurance yet, like the FDIC, it could
simultaneously examine and supervise financial institutions that it
insures.169 In this way, the FMIC would force compliance to a host of
regulations without meeting the opposition that would inevitably come if
its primary purpose was regulation. That said, the FMIC could provide

166
Id. Contributing to the problem, in September 2008, IndyMac bank failed and became the
most expensive bank failure in the FDIC’s history at $32 billion. Id. Just one week later, Washington
Mutual followed suit with assets of nearly $310 billion. Id. Luckily, as receiver, the FDIC brokered
the purchase of Washington Mutual with JP Morgan on Sept. 26, 2008. See id.; see also Eric Dash &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html?_r=1.
167
Evans, supra note 165. The FDIC requires insurance premiums at approximately one percent
of all deposits. This is a relatively small percentage. Exacerbating this disparity in insurance liability
versus reserve insurance capital, Congress recently passed a bill that temporarily increased insured
bank accounts from $100,000 to $250,000.
Congress increased coverage to reassure
investors/depositors and encourage depositors to leave excess funds in the banks to keep banks
capitalized. However, as a result of the FDIC’s fast depleting funds, they are considering increasing
the one percent premium, which would potentially counteract Congress’ efforts to capitalize banks at a
critical economic time.
168
MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14.
169
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 164.
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either direct or indirect regulation.
Whether a direct or indirect
regulator, the FMIC would be a central regulation entity and set the
standards for underwriting, capitalization, consumer education, back end
fees, broker education, and subprime fees—prerequisites to qualifying for
insurance coverage.
Thus, one of the most important roles of the FMIC would be to provide
an efficient, consistent, and uniform source of loan regulation in an age
when loan packages are evolving daily. During the past decade, nearly
every major regulatory body in the federal government, that has anything
to do with mortgages, has publicly acknowledged the need for major
mortgage regulation reform.171 The following sections outline a few new
regulatory schemes that the FMIC could implement in an effort to stabilize
and strengthen the mortgage industry and, ultimately, the national
economy. Some of these changes are large scale, and some would be very
specific and detailed.172
1. FMIC and a Dual Lending System
With the creation of the FMIC, Congress could consider the possibility
of a “dual lender system” to mirror the “dual banking system.” For
decades, the banking system has operated with some banks regulated by
state governments and others by the federal government. Similarly,
lenders—like banks—could operate under the same model and decide
whether to be regulated and insured under federal or state laws. At first
glance, this concept may appear to undermine this Notes’s thesis which
calls for developing a centralized federal mortgage entity. But, if the
federal FMIC program offered sufficient incentives, the country could
potentially arrive at the same end (centralized regulatory regime) having
imposed significantly less coercive means (“incentives” for participation
instead of “compulsory” adherence). In other words, just as most major
banks have gravitated toward the federal protection and regulation offered
by the FDIC, so might mortgage lending institutions gravitate toward the
170
The FMIC regulation practices could be roughly modeled after the FDIC, which is an indirect
regulator of financial institutions. In other words, while the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
is the official regulator of banking institutions, the FDIC imposes the minimum capitalization
requirements that most often force banks into receivership. Alternatively, the FHA—under the
Housing Urban Development—provides its own lending standards and is an example of a direct
regulator of loans processed under its insurance policies.
171
Peterson, supra note 94, at 5 (discussing the several federal agencies that have publicly called
for further lending regulation, including the Fed’s Board of Governors, HUD, FTC, OCC, FHFB, OTS,
NCUA, OFHEO, FDIC, GAO, and the DOJ).
172
Rather than give a long list of possible regulatory concepts that could be implemented with the
advent of the FMIC, this section provides a few concepts that could be implemented by the new entity.
In each subsection, I have attempted to provide a short discussion of why the proposed change in
regulation would be useful, as well as how it would work. There are dozens more regulatory ideas that
could (and perhaps should) be added, but I have included just a few specific proposals to start (or
perpetuate) the national regulatory reform conversation.
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same benefits offered by the FMIC. A glaring difference between the two
industries (banking and mortgage) that could potentially stifle the
movement of lenders from state to federal governance, is that unlike the
FDIC, consumers would not directly benefit from the FMIC insurance
coverage. Thus, consumers would potentially apply less pressure on
lending institutions to register with the FMIC in order to receive federal
insurance coverage. But this shortfall is not conclusive because investors
would play a significant role in the decision.
Lending institutions would potentially receive a great deal of pressure
from investors concerned with the stability of mortgage backed securities
and stocks. Additionally, Congress could pass legislation requiring
lending institutions to insure at least fifty percent of all loan products.
These two factors would provide incentive to lending institutions to
consider the federal FMIC insurance and governance, and would
simultaneously coerce reform in the private mortgage insurance industry to
provide insurance products that extend fifty percent coverage.
Notably, the FDIC boasts that it is, “the primary federal regulator of
banks that are chartered by the states that do not join the Federal Reserve
System.”173 This fact may suggest that were the country to adopt a dual
lending system, state-lending institutions may prefer to adhere to the
federal regulations imposed by the FMIC—whether or not the institution
participated in the federal insurance program.
The appeal of a dual lending system is that it could be the only way to
appease those who may oppose the creation of the FMIC as a complete
reformation of the mortgage lending industry under federal jurisdiction.174
Under a dual lending system, the FMIC would provide incentives for
mortgage lenders to adhere to centralized federal mortgage laws, become
sufficiently insured, and stabilize capital without jeopardizing federalism
or forcing nationwide adherence to a new regulatory regime.175
2. FMIC Required Disclosure of Yield Spreads
Through TILA, the Real Estate Settlement Act, and HOEPA, Congress
has successfully required increased lender disclosure and borrower
understanding.176 But, in the case of yield spreads, these regulations fall
short of their intended purpose.
When the average consumer meets with a mortgage lender to begin the
173

Who is the FDIC?, supra note 164.
See supra Parts II.C., III.B. (discussing the opposing viewpoints concerning mortgage reform).
175
This “dual lending” regulatory regime is strictly an idea to help catalyze negotiation between
opposing political viewpoints: those who are calling for a large-scale federal solution and those who
prefer state sovereignty and institutional independence. That said, while the proposal for two systems
of regulation may help increase the widespread attractiveness of the proposal, it is not likely the most
efficient method.
176
See supra Part III.A. (discussing TILA, the Real Estate Settlement Act, and HOEPA).
174
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loan process, the borrower is often barraged with many intricate details.
Preliminary talks revolve around the consumer’s credit history, salary,
length of employment, tax returns, and current debt-to-income status.
Accordingly, most initial meetings with a lender turn out to be more of a
“borrower interview” than a “mortgage lender interview.” Those buyers
who are not savvy in the process find the experience—wrought with heaps
of paperwork, a steep learning curve, and incomprehensible legal and
financial jargon—intimidating. Among the most important parts of an
initial meeting with a lender is the moment where the lender provides the
“rate quote.” Differing brokers will regularly quote varying rates
according to the buyer’s credit, job, and payment history. Unbeknownst to
non-savvy borrowers, the rate quote is arguably the most important
distinction between lenders and is a primary purpose of “interviewing
lenders.” Many consumers believe the mortgage broker’s job is simply to
quote the lowest rate for which the consumer can qualify. Many
consumers assume that the rates are set solely by the Fed and that banks
and mortgage brokers lend to similar buyers at the same rates—which is
not true. There are many competing forces at play when the mortgage
broker quotes a rate to a potential borrower. First, lenders have incentive
to quote low rates in order to win borrower trust. But, lenders are usually
also given incentives via lender “yield spreads,” which provide kickbacks
to mortgage brokers for quoting rates higher than the rate for which the
buyer is qualified. In other words, a yield spread is essentially a fee paid
by the lender to the mortgage broker for quoting an interest rate that
exceeds the interest rate for which the buyer is qualified.
Defenders of the yield spread claim that the fee is of no concern to the
consumer because the lender pays the back end fee. Critics claim that the
consumer pays for the fee over the course of the loan and therefore
deserves full disclosure.
Two minor requirements could drastically alter the yield spread
controversy. First, the FMIC could require lenders to provide full
disclosure by providing rate sheets for the borrower to sign. These rate
sheets would simply show the consumer the established rate, the rate the
consumer qualified for, and the rate the mortgage broker offered the
consumer. Second, the FMIC could require a “fee disclosure sheet” that
would disclose the fee being paid to the mortgage broker and the amount
the borrower will pay over the life of the loan as a result of the increase in
rate. When full disclosure of a fee will largely eliminate the fee, there is
little question about whether the fee should be legal or not.
3. FMIC Required Consumer Education
Bolstering the proposal to require mortgage brokers to provide
meaningful disclosure about fees, but reaching more broadly, the FMIC
could require that an informational program accompany each loan that
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exceeded a fifty percent LTV ratio. This process could be completed
either by paper or electronically. Currently, many colleges and universities
across the country require students to complete online tutorials in order to
access student loans. These tutorials increase awareness about fees, loan
restrictions, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, late charges, and
interest rates. Specific to mortgages, a program or paper tutorial required
by the FMIC could explain simple nuances that relate to the consumer’s
type of loan, including: types of amortization, risks of reverse
amortization, risks of no-interest loans, fees accompanying refinancing,
and consequences of adjustable rate mortgages.
4. FMIC Required Suitability Standards
Requiring suitability standards within the mortgage lending market
means to require mortgage brokers to ensure that loans are suitable for the
circumstances of the borrowers that receive them.177 Generally, suitability
doctrines are associated with stockbrokers; but, more recently, suitability
requirements have been applied in the insurance industry. Some scholars
argue that the insurance industry’s recent adoption of the suitability
requirement provides impetus for suitability in the mortgage industry.178
One of the major concerns with imposing suitability requirements in the
lending industry is that since brokers work for lenders, they cannot
simultaneously represent the borrower. In this way, critics claim that
mortgage broker allegiance to the lender (employer) creates a conflict of
interest. Conversely, those who support extending the suitability doctrine
counter that seventy percent of loans are extended by mortgage brokers
who have a stark negotiating advantage over their clients and a financial
incentive to dupe their clients.179
Additionally, some state regulators have already begun requiring
pseudo-suitability requirements through creative regulation. For example,
if a regulator perceives that a loan was not suitable for a client then some
177
Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the Mortgage Lending
Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fires of Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 21–22
(2008).
178
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1331–35 (2002) (describing the evolution of the insurance
industry to adopt the suitability requirement beginning with the Anderson v. Knox decision in 1961
through a period where several states adopted the doctrine: Finally, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioner (“NAIC”) recommended that “all states adopt a suitability requirement for the
sale of life insurance and annuity products.” The SEC justified adopting the suitability doctrine
because “disclosure does not provide adequate protection to investors. In the seminal case of Phillips &
Co., the SEC imposed a suitability requirement because ‘disclosure requirements and practices alone
had not been wholly effective in protecting the investor.’”).
179
Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility, Preemption, and Hermeneutical
Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61, 63 (2007) (noting
that mortgage brokers originate approximately seventy percent of all residential mortgage loans, have
unique access to borrowers and incentive to extract high fees, and have been identified as primary
participants in predatory lending).
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regulators make the theoretical jump to assert that the same loan
undermines the lending system and is therefore illegal. “Historically,
absent special mitigating circumstances, lenders do not even owe
borrowers the duty of care to avoid negligence in the lending process,
although some regulators take a contrary position based upon their primary
goal to ensure safety and soundness to the banking system.”180
As a result, some states have begun gravitating toward actually
requiring suitability standards of mortgage lenders.181 For example, a
recently enacted statute in Maine imposes suitability requirements that
hold the mortgage broker responsible for (1) determining whether the
borrower is able to make the scheduled payments during the course of the
loan and (2) verifying employment, income, and credit.182 Similarly, the
FMIC could reasonably require that mortgage brokers accept suitability
requirements in exchange for insurance on the loans they write.
5. FMIC Required Securitization Standards
The FMIC could also provide standards and information regarding the
securitization of the products it insures. For several years, scholars have
opined that by regulating home loan securitization standards, the federal
government could effectively stifle funds that support the subprime
mortgage problem.183 During the last decade, securitization was a
precipitating factor because it facilitated the renewing of funds for
predatory loans by way of investment.184 The problem was that Wall
Street firms securitized home loans without regard to either the fairness or
the quality of the loan.185 Several negative externalities derive from
unregulated home loan securitization. First, securitization of subprime
loans often provides funds for small lenders who are statistically more
likely to participate in loan abuses because they are not heavily
regulated.186 Second, negligent securitization provides incentives to
lenders and mortgage brokers to continue unfair loan practices by
providing a secondary market for them to shift their risk.187 Third,
investors’ demands for higher returns on subprime loans encourage lenders
to gouge subprime borrowers.188
To date, it remains unclear whether this is a mortgage industry
180

Hirsch, supra note 177, at 22–23.
Id. at 25.
182
Id. at 31.
183
Engel & McCoy, supra note 19, at 2039–40.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 2040–41; SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 21, at 136 (discussing the difficulty
of evaluating the risk of securities and the unscrupulous mortgage originators that were allowed to lend
to borrowers that were likely to default).
186
Id. at 2041.
187
Id.
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Id.
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360

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:319

problem or an SEC problem. The FMIC could at least provide guidelines
by which loan products are created and require a heightened standard for
all products that are resold to the secondary market.
6. FMIC Required Down Payment and Elimination of Gold Accounts
In the distant past, most lenders required a down payment before
approving a borrower to qualify for a loan. This down payment served as
proof of the buyer’s commitment to the purchase, and his or her ability to
save up for the investment; it also mitigated the lender’s risk. Most lenders
required the money to come from the borrower’s own bank account, which
forced the borrower to show a savings history over several months. In
other words, most lenders prevented borrowers from using gifts, grants, or
friends to provide the down payment on real property.
Recently, the FHA and VA programs have insured loans that require
three percent down payments. Compared to other loans, this is a relatively
small amount. Even more surprising, these specialized government loan
programs allow buyers to borrow and receive gifts to pay the down
payment. In fact, the “gift” need not come from a family member or
friend, it can come from the seller. In such transactions, the seller
“donates” the three percent down payment to a “Gold Account” and the
down payment is paid to the buyer’s mortgage lender from the Gold
Account.
There are several problems with the current government-sponsored
down payment program. First, the program creates incentive to buyers,
sellers, lenders, and appraisers to commit “white-lie loan fraud.” For
example, suppose a desperate-to-sell homeowner markets his or her
$350,000 home for a six month period. Further, suppose that the
homeowner meets an equally desperate buyer that has longed to buy a
home, but does not earn enough to save a sufficient down payment. The
buyer and seller find a “win win solution” wherein both get what they want
at the expense of societal externalities. The buyer offers the seller
$375,000 for the home (well above the value and asking price of the house)
and the seller agrees to pay the buyer’s closing costs and the buyer’s down
payment.189 The buyer gets the house of his dreams without paying a
dollar out of pocket and the seller gets full price for the house—even after
paying the buyer’s requests. At first glance, only one entity loses, the
lender; but in the case of federal loans (FHA) and loans packaged and sold
to federal entities (Ginnie Mae), the lender is actually the American
189
This transaction is considered loan fraud in most states and by most lenders, unless the seller’s
contribution passes through a federally approved seller contribution plan available only in dealing with
FHA (i.e., government) loans. Although, notably, there are many legal products offered by lenders,
which allow borrowers one-hundred percent financing: eighty-twenty loans, ninety-ten loans, and one
hundred percent loans.
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taxpayer. Additionally, the higher sale price on the home inflates
neighborhood prices and triggers a housing bubble. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that, if the buyer cannot make his payments (either
because his ARM begins to increase, or he loses his job), he will not likely
be able to find a buyer at the inflated $375,000 price range—particularly in
the 2008–09 market where real estate bubbles have collapsed. Thus, in
addition to providing insurance, the FMIC could provide thresholds for
acceptable loan products and appropriate down payments.190
7. FMIC Required Foreclosure Practice
During 2008 and 2009, millions of houses ended up in the queue for
foreclosure. While each state deals with foreclosure differently, and each
lender has different foreclosure policies and procedures, a few ineffective
practices occur throughout the country. The FMIC could require lenders to
participate in programs designed to waylay foreclosures—or even
streamline foreclosures—in order to curb insurance claims for foreclosure
losses and stabilize our country’s volatile real estate market.
Foreclosures are caused by a myriad of reasons, but all of the reasons
start with a homeowner’s desire to sell. Several circumstances force
homeowners to sell: lost jobs, employment relocation, adjustable rate
mortgage rate changes, divorce, college, etc. When someone is forced to
sell and cannot find a buyer to pay the amount owed on the house, the
person is forced into foreclosure. Sometimes, in the case of a short sale, a
distressed seller can appeal to the mortgage lender to accept a buyer’s offer
for a percentage of the loan amount, regardless of the fact that the seller
owes more than the purchase price. If the home cannot be sold through
normal means, and it cannot be “short-sold,” then the bank must foreclose
on the property. Approximately ninety days later the bank will usually
attempt to sell the home at foreclosure sale for a decreased price to
investors. If the home does not sell for cash it becomes a bank owned
property and the bank either holds the property in its portfolio or unloads
the property to other investors for a nominal price.
These steps to foreclosure—and beyond—have become commonplace
190
For example, the FMIC could require five percent—to pick an arbitrary number—that would
at least provide some threshold safeguard against the systemic externalities precipitated by both mass
loan manipulation and lender's incessant desire to create increasingly risky loan products in order to
achieve short term personal gains. Also, it is notable that after the initial writing of this Note the
government has suspended the seller contribution program; however not apparently due to societal
externalities but because of cost of foreclosure. Shaun Donovan, Remarks at the 6th Annual Housing
Policy Council Meeting (May 7, 2009) available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2009-0507.cfm (“Note that at the beginning of the current fiscal year, seller funded down payment assistance
loans accounted for 14 percent of all FHA loans outstanding, but generated 31 percent of all FHA
foreclosures and 31 percent of all losses on foreclosed-properties. Looking forward, we estimate that
without the elimination of this program, FHA would have needed an FY 2010 appropriation of over
$2.5 billion. Instead, we project that FHA will return to the tax payer over $1.7 billion.”)
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in our lending system because they represent the path of least resistance for
banks. However, if the government were to provide insurance, the
insurance entity could do more than just hedge against bank losses; it could
set the standard for bank actions that must be performed before issuing the
insurance claim. A different set of “foreclosure practices,” sculpted by the
government, could favor the entire economy. A few examples of possible
reform within the foreclosure structure, that could potentially help the
market from entering a negative feedback loop, are provided below.
First, the FMIC could require the bank to accept certain short sale
offers when a distressed seller has appropriately proven that foreclosure
will inevitably ensue. In many states, bank short sales are ineffective and
the process is inefficient. Short sales often fail and banks stubbornly push
on to foreclosure because it is an easier event to explain to bank
investors.191 Meanwhile, payments continue to go unpaid, the property
deteriorates, and often the market continues to soften. By forcing the bank
to cooperate early in the foreclosure process (short sales), the FMIC could
effectively eliminate a large number of foreclosures and mitigate industry
losses.
Second, the FMIC could require banks to provide a forty-five-day
grace period for qualified buyers who wish to bid at foreclosure auctions.
Currently many jurisdictions require investors to pay cash within twentyfour hours of the foreclosure auction. The “here and now” mentality of
banks effectively precludes the general public from participating in the
foreclosure process. Investors that search for properties at forty, fifty, and
sixty cents on the dollar pull down the bank’s ability to recoup debt, drop
the value of foreclosed real estate, and simultaneously harm the resale
market. The FMIC could revolutionize the foreclosure market by allowing
a forty-five day window to qualified buyers who provide $10,000 in nonrefundable earnest money to close on a foreclosure property. Additionally,
the process fails to draw on the buying power of the entire market. Many
of the nation’s state foreclosure systems extract homes from those who are
poor and then open the bidding process only to those who are rich and have
hundreds of thousands of dollars of cash to invest.
These FMIC requirements could decrease the number of homes pushed
into foreclosure every year and decrease the crippling effect foreclosures
191

In a typical short sale, the bank must receive sufficient documentation to show that the seller is
truly “distressed” in order to appease management and investors. This requirement is only the first of
the hurdles. Perhaps the largest complication is that often the broker price opinion (an inexpensive
bank appraisal) is higher than a deflated market will support (partly because the appraisal is often based
on comparable sales during past months). Thus, legitimate short sale offers are often rejected by
lending institutions. On the other hand, when a property is foreclosed, the bank and investors in the
bank expect less from the property and are more willing to cut their losses. But the problem remains
that the market for foreclosed properties is significantly smaller and more picky. Thus, forcing banks
into short selling at reasonable losses would be better for the lender, seller, buyer, and, ultimately, the
market as a whole.
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have on the market.
V. CONCLUSION
The FMIC proposal provides a strong foundational cornerstone for
further discussion and illustrates a viable and workable solution that draws
on major legal and economic principles—proven in other markets—that
would most likely stabilize the mortgage market. Granted, the program
would be difficult to analyze before implementing. Extensive deliberation,
debate, and research would be required in order for Congress to fully
analyze the effects that such a large-scale program would have on the
market. Fortunately, consideration could begin with detailed research on
the similarly large-scale reformations that developed in the wake of the
Great Depression: the SEC, FDIC, FHA, and the Fed. Similar to the
proposal for the FMIC, many of the past federal efforts to create
centralized regulation and capitalization in various industries were spurred
on by a looming market meltdown. 192
While it is difficult to anticipate every effect the FMIC might have,
some market reactions can be confidently anticipated. For example, the
FMIC insurance premium payments—paid either by consumers, lending
institutions, or both—would undoubtedly slow lending in the mortgage
market. The effect of a slowed lending industry would in turn slow the
housing market and perhaps cause a slight drop in market prices (because
sellers would inevitably struggle to find qualified buyers).193 On the other
hand, investor confidence would significantly increase and the demand for
mortgage-backed securities—insured by a government entity—would
likely create a counteracting influx of investor cash.194 The result would be
an increase in the availability of loans, which would catalyze market
growth. Thus, even though insurance premiums may potentially slow
market forces, investor confidence would likely counterbalance negative
effects.
Admittedly, there are other alternative solutions. Each alternative
solution—and each variation of the FMIC—would inevitably be
accompanied by positive and negative effects and repercussions. But, the
FMIC does represent a more thorough and long-term solution than is
192
The Fed was created in response to the frequent bank runs early in the century. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 35, at 76.
193
This same cause and effect cycle is perhaps illustrated most notably by the 2008 housing
market: (1) panic among banks slowed lending which slowed buying; (2) slowed buying required
sellers to lower prices; (3) lower prices devalued bank collateral on issued loans; and (4) deflating bank
assets undermined the stability of lending institutions at the very point when foreclosures began to
increase.
194
Investor response would likely increase because even though the government was “partly”
involved in mortgages before, the relationship between the government and secondary market lenders
Fannie and Freddie—“government sponsored entities”—was always too ambiguous for full investor
confidence.
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currently before Congress. In other words, it is a solution that exceeds the
recent knee-jerk reactions of Congress to simply avoid recession, avoid
contagion, and avoid depression. The United States deserves a long-term
solution that the FMIC could provide.195
The FMIC solution thoroughly weighs many of the most important
mortgage industry shortcomings and provides workable answers that place
the burden of capital reserves on the industry—not the taxpayer. The
FMIC addresses the most fundamental—and incidentally the most
difficult—problems within the mortgage lending legal system: insufficient
capital reserves, decentralized regulation, inconsistent state standards,
slipshod disclosure, inadequate consumer education, and taxpayer
insurance. For these reasons, the time has come to seriously consider
implementing large-scale reform to provide long-term solutions for the
mortgage industry.

195
The FMIC solution is more reliable than the haphazard bailout of the mortgage industry with
taxpayer capital. It is more comprehensive than the current sporadic state efforts to patch up an
insufficient predatory regime. And it avoids creating greater systemic risk by morphing bankrupted
financial entities that are “too big to fail” into even bigger companies.

